Putin's War, Week 90. Grain Corridor Reopens and Russia Hints at Another Major Retreat

By streiff | 3:09 PM on November 17, 2023
The opinions expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of RedState.com.
CREDIT: manhhai on Flickr/CC by 2.0

Welcome to the belated update covering Week 90 of Putin's War.

As I've discussed for the last month or so, the focus of this war has shifted dramatically from the battlefields in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia to Brussels and Washington. It has become a war of military attrition in the trenches around Avdiivka and a war of political attrition that pits the staying power of President Volodymyr Zelensky's government and of his Western allies against the resilience of Putin's Russia. I'm still of the view that the West, particularly an EU that is increasingly influenced by Poland rather than Germany on this issue is in it for the long haul. I think the US is in for the duration, too. There is a solid Senate majority that favors Ukraine aid, and the anti-Ukraine (and, in some situations, the obviously pro-Russian) members of the House can't stop funding there.

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While much of the attention is focused on the US and EU, a couple of interesting things have happened in Russia that bear watching. First, families of mobiks have started to protest, and an increasing number of Russians are openly sympathizing with anti-war Russians. The Afghan War ended for Russia when mothers of soldiers started protesting in Red Square. Families of mobiks are frequently not informed of their soldier's death, they are denied a death gratuity and rarely are the bodies returned to Russia. Disabled soldiers rarely get rehabilitative care and are frequently denied pensions.

The outpouring of support for this 33-year-old woman on trial for writing "stop the war" on department store price tags has forced the judge to close the trial to the public.

Second, and much more significant, Russian media seems to be preparing the population for a major withdrawal in Ukraine in the same way they prepped the public for abandoning the right bank of the Dnieper River and for the "goodwill gesture" they made by retreating from Snake Island.

This "defeatism" only appears on Russian television with official sanction.

Here are some of my past updates. For all my Ukraine War coverage, click here.

Putin's War, Week 89. Zelensky Gets an EU Invitation, the EU Looks East and the Russians Have a Timetable

Putin's War, Week 88. Zelensky Is Blindsided by TIME Magazine and the Offensive Gets a Postmortem 

Putin's War, Week 87. The Battlefield Shifts to Washington and Brussels

Putin's War, Week 86. The Very Resistible Force Meets the Immovable Object in Donbas

Putin's War, Week 85. The Curtain Goes Down on the Ukrainian Offensive and Russia Rolls for a Hard Six

Putin's War, Week 83. Zelensky Gets ATACMS From Biden and a Cold Shoulder From McCarthy

Putin's War, Week 82. Russia Dissed at the UN and the War Moves Toward Rasputitsa

Putin's War, Week 81

Putin's War, Week 80. Ukraine's Offensive Continues Slow Progress as Fingers Are Pointed

Putin's War, Week 79. Surovikin Line Penetrated as Russia Staggers Toward a '1917 Moment' in Zaporizhzhia

Putin's War, Week 78. Prigozhin Crashes, Two Russian Bomber Bases and Moscow Hit by Drones

Many more are available at this link.

Politico-Strategic Level


Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Celebrates Kherson Liberation Anniversary.

On November 11, 2022, the Russian Army tucked tail and ignominiously retreated from the area of Kherson on the right bank of the Dneiper River that it had illegally occupied for over eight months. The takeaway from that campaign is that Russia was forced to withdraw due to maneuver, not sledgehammer blows. Ukrainian artillery cut the bridges across the Dneiper, making all Russian forces on the right bank dependent on what could be ferried across. A secondary topic that hasn't been explored is the degree to which Ukrainian and Russian commanders arrived at an agreement that allowed the Russians to retreat unmolested. In return, the Russians did not resort to scorched earth.

My commemoration of that event is a tweet from one of the most pompous, know-nothing, often-wrong-never-in-doubt Russian accounts still cranking out drivel and hogwash every day.

Germany Increases Ukraine Aid

Polish Government Resigns

EU Sees Ukraine as a First Step to Further Expansion

Last week, I posted about EU President Ursala von der Leyen opening talks to lay the groundwork for Ukraine to enter the EU; see Putin's War, Week 89. Zelensky Gets an EU Invitation, the EU Looks East and the Russians Have a Timetable. In the comment threads, my fellow refugee from Lucianne.com, Laocoรถn of Troy, noted:

Ursula von der Leyen like all EU officials isn't speaking or acting for herself. She is a European bureaucrat and she's articulating a policy that's been discussed and has the support of a rough consensus already. This was probably discussed and decided months if not a year ago. Every word was carefully crafted. You can change the face and name on the briefing document and whoever was speaking it would sound the same. Europeans don't digress from the script.

Indeed.

Having made offers to Ukraine and Moldova and accepted the candidacy of Georgia, the EU has placed its sights squarely on the Balkans, probably with the exception of Kosovo and Serbia. This would confront Putin with a massive economic and political competitor all along its western frontier, and it would strip Russia of its messianic role as the protector of Russians and the overlord of Slavs. Combine that with convincing Finland and Sweden to join NATO, Vladimir Putin must be acknowledged as a strategic savant non-pareil...for Brussels and Washington.

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Black Sea Grain Corridor Reopens Without Russian Permission

In an amazing accomplishment for a country without a functioning navy, Ukraine has reopened a grain corridor. despite the Russian Navy trying to shut it down.

This is a direct result of Ukraine's multi-domain war combining unmanned surface vessels, UAVs, as well as Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG cruise missiles with the impending threat of ATACMS and extended-range Neptune anti-ship missiles to make Sevastopol untenable to Russia's Black Sea Fleet and force them from the southwestern sector of the Black Sea.

Russian Television Shows Why Russia Must Lose

I hear repeated calls in social media and among some of the commenters here that someone, I'm never sure who must bring Russia and Ukraine together to hammer out a deal. What is left unsaid is the outlines of an agreement. That's deliberate, of course, as the Venn Diagram between those demanding negotiations and those fluffing Putin is just one circle.

The reason why negotiations with Russia are futile is because the current Russian power structure doesn't agree that Ukraine is a country. Without that agreement, any ceasefire is merely an opportunity for Russia to rearm and launch another war.

The only agreement possible is the evacuation of Russian forces from the 1992 borders of Ukraine at independence and providing Ukraine with arms and security alliances to guarantee its independence.

The Battle Over the Narrative

One of the reasons for this phenomenon may be Russian influence operations. Reporters run in packs because being wrong in a group is safer than being right by yourself. They also tend to be captured by experts, particularly journalists, and follow their lead. When some of those journalists and academic experts are on the Russian payroll, it influences the narrative. And the narrative often shapes public opinion and government policy.

Taking Out the Trash

As I've noted several times, the argument that we should not help Ukraine because it is "corrupt" is a rather flimsy one. If your objection is to corruption, Ukraine is much less corrupt than Russia and is getting less so. Russia continues to get more corrupt. Even accepting that argument, the Zelensky government is using the war to clean up corruption that would have been very difficult to attack during peacetime. 

I Hate It When That Happens


Operational Level

The operational picture remains the same as last week. Russia continues to attack in several areas. The offensive operations focus on cutting off the Ukrainian salient at Avdiivka. I assess the other offensive operations around Kupiansk and Bakhmut are designed to freeze Ukrainian forces in place and possibly force Ukraine to reinforce those efforts to the detriment of the defense of Avdiivka. The Russian goal is two-fold. 

First, provide Putin a tangible victory as he "campaigns" for "reelection." Reducing the Avdiivka salient would boost morale, quieten the voices counseling peace, and give control of most of the historical boundaries of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. 

Second, demoralize Ukraine's government, its military, and its backers in the West.

In my view, it is a huge gamble that is predicated on Russia being able to sustain the losses they are suffering. 


Summary Execution as a Leadership Technique

Like Mike Ford, I'm convinced that the operational center of gravity in this war is the staying power of the Russian Army. I don't post every terrible story I see because troops in every army are notorious whiners and complainers (as my first First Sergeant told me, "Sir, a soldier has a right to bitch"). Sometimes, things that are significant pop out.

Functioning armies do not resort to summary executions. The fact that troops are sufficiently incensed to make a video about it is an indication of how seriously they take it and how little faith they have in their chain of command. A commissioned officer gunning down a soldier in what amounts to a personal dispute indicates that discipline in that unit has all but collapsed.

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This is not the only hint that things aren't well. I'll confess to never having served in the Russian Army, but if I or one of my officers or NCOs had treated even the most noxious dirtbag private like this, we'd have been afraid to go anywhere alone or to sleep. Perhaps the people serving in the Russian Army, of all ranks, are so morally degraded that this is considered acceptable. If so, it makes an excellent case for sending Ukraine more cluster munitions.

Shell Hunger

I contend that the war in Ukraine was nearly a godsend for the US and its allies in Europe and Asia. For thirty years, the free world has let its defense industrial base erode. While the US defense industry proudly points out its high-tech products, the blue-collar part of the industry has nearly collapsed. During the Base Realignment and Closure craze that followed the demise of the Soviet Union, ammunition plants, one of the largest sectors of the industrial base, were targeted for elimination. 

As it turned out, that wasn't a great idea. Not only were factories closed, but the facilities that made the machine tools to make machinery to build new factories were dismantled. We've discovered there were human skills involved, like "sweating" solid explosives into liquid, that were nearly lost. The ammunition consumption rates in Ukraine rival those in World War II's European theater. Supporting Ukraine has snapped the West out of its slumber before it has to face China in a war somewhere. 

Next year, things will dramatically improve. The US is bringing new factories online. 

Rheinmetall has taken over Spain's moribund ammunition industry and is pumping in money (Putin's War, Week 75. Putin Cucked, Moscow Droned Again, and the Industrial War Hits High Gear โ€“ RedState). It is also activating its mothballed factories (Putin's War, Week 73. Putin Eludes Arrest, Black Sea Grain Initiative Dies, and Ukraine's Offense Continues to Grind Away โ€“ RedState). Fourteen countries are now producing ammunition for Ukraine.

So, yes, the EU is behind on deliveries, but that is a temporary affair. And the Russian ammunition problem is at least as severe, and I don't think Russia has the reserve capacity to match that emerging in the West.

Black Sea Order of Battle

The Ukrainian Armed Forces carried out another attack on Russian ships in Crimea. I've covered that attack below. As retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges said, making Crimea untenable for the Russian military; see Putin's War, Week 89. Zelensky Gets an EU Invitation, the EU Looks East and the Russians Have a Timetable.

This chart shows the collective effect of the successful campaign a non-naval power has conducted against the Black Sea Fleet.

It doesn't reflect the fact that most of the Russian ships stationed at Sevastopol have been moved to other bases (Putin's War, Week 88. Zelensky Is Blindsided by TIME Magazine and the Offensive Gets a Postmortem), or surface combatants that have moved to the Mediterranean.

About to Bring the Hammer Down

Last week, I posted about a Ukrainian brigade hit by a Russian missile strike as it held an awards ceremony; see Putin's War, Week 89. Zelensky Gets an EU Invitation, the EU Looks East and the Russians Have a Timetable. The incident not only gutted a very competent combat unit, but the widespread distribution of images of the event shamed the Ukrainian Army. The Defense Ministry has investigated, and action against the people who thought this was a good idea seems imminent.

USAF Releases Contract for Training Ukrainian F-16 Pilots

If training fighter pilots for Ukraine is to be a long-term project, it requires stability in the instructor force. A new solicitation by the Air Force indicates that is exactly what is planned.

As the USAF was standing up a long-term training program, Romania announced it was opening an F-16 pilot training center serving NATO and Ukraine.

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Rheinmetall and Ukraine Partnership Expands

Rheinmetall and Ukraine are developing a relationship critical to Ukraine's long-term security. Rheinmetall operates another repair facility jointly with Poland and is building a tank factory in Ukraine (Putin's War, Week 74. The Crack in the Russian Wall Appears and Ben & Jerry's Employees Join the Russian Army โ€“ RedState).

Russia Moves More Air Defense Systems to Ukraine

According to UK intelligence, Russia is moving air defense systems that protect other parts of Russia to the Ukrainian theater of operations. This shows the attraction of air defense systems in theater and the inability of Russian industry to make the systems as fast as they are being destroyed.

New Weapons

Caracal

Combat Operations

Sustaining Combat Power

This is one of the key differences between the two armies fighting in Ukraine.

Where most disabled Ukrainian vehicles are repairable and recovered, most Russian vehicles disabled in combat never return to action. The crew abandons them, and there is no attempt made at recovery. The video circulating on Telegram indicates that there are Ukrainian drone units dedicated to destroying abandoned vehicles. The larger problem is that we're seeing that a majority of Russian vehicles hit by ATGM, tanks, 30mm auto-cannon, drones, artillery, whatever, are catastrophic kills; that is, they blow up.

This makes a huge difference in sustaining combat power.

Russian Attacks Near Adiivka

I'll talk more about the ongoing Russian assault on the Ukrainian salient at Avdiivka. That fighting is producing a lot of video, and rather than cluttering up the discussion of the battle, I'll drop it in here.


The Vanishing Ka-52

The Ka-52 has been critical to Russia's success in stopping the Ukrainian Spring Offensive. That airframe is becoming more scarce. The first reason is that the more you use a weapon system like an attack helicopter, the more of them you lose. The Russians started the war with a maximum of 133 Ka-52. Russia has produced an estimated eight new helicopters since the war began. There is visual evidence of 58 losses verified by oryxspioenkop.com before it closed its doors on October 1 and a claim of 10 losses to MANPADS since then. At least ten were lost in the ATACMS strike on two Russian airbases (Russia Claims US ATACMS Missiles Hit Two Airbases in Occupied Ukraine โ€“ RedState). In a best-case scenario, there are 55 Ka-52 remaining, and we have no information on how many of those are flyable and the operational readiness rate of the flyable ones. I would be shocked if over a third of the remaining Ka-52 fleet could get airborne at one time.

The second factor is that the Russians have pulled their forward-based helicopter fleet back to Rostov-on-Don. This means Ka-52s must move to forward area rearm and refuel points (FARPs). They must return to their permanent base to do routine maintenance or repair battle damage. It is a process that increases crew fatigue, uses more fuel, and results in fewer combat sorties and more incidental losses to mechanical failure.

More Gepards

The Gepard, an obsolescent air defense system, debuted in Putin's War only 71 weeks ago, Putin's War, Week 19. Political Uncertainty, Lots of New Weapons, and a Replay of the Western Front. Since then, it has become an indispensable tool in protecting units and point targets from drones and missile attacks. More of them have been pulled out of mothballs and are on their way to the front lines.

Something Old, Something New...

Ukraine is not only using German Gepards but is also using much older systems. Here is a Soviet ZU-23-2 23mm antiaircraft gun in action. Instead of shooting at ground targets, it is being used to engage aerial targets, which is something this system hasn't done since the Vietnam War.

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The War on Drones Continues

Here, a Ukrainian unit with the mission of attacking Russian drone crews and launch sites. I have questions about the effectiveness of this attack. Are the guys who carried the man away part of the drone launch team? Was there a follow-up attack to eliminate the drones that can be seen on the roof? 

Still, it shows that being a drone team member is every bit as hazardous as duty on the front lines.

Su-25 Shot Down

This is the eighth Su-25 strike fighter lost near Avdiivka since October 10.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

You Can Run, But You Can't Hide

I've frequently commented on the profound change the presence of cheap and lethal drones is bringing to the battlefield. Multimillion-dollar tanks are reduced to smoldering scrap metal by a grenade dropped from a drone. Drone artillery spotters are making "shoot and scoot" a dangerous option for self-propelled artillery. Now, the impact is filtering down to how infantry squads operate. In this video, for reasons that aren't clear, a Russian squad shelters in a burned-out BTR armored personnel carrier. As it turns out, that wasn't a great idea.

In this video, a two-man Russian MANPADS team is to cover the area of the Ukrainian bridgehead in Kherson and was spotted by a Ukrainian reconnaissance drone controlling an FPV suicide drone.

Here a "Scooby Doo" van used by the Russian Army to transport troops tries to evade a drone. I have to give the driver credit for skill and effort.

This is a Russian "chase car" detailed to follow a homeward-bound Ukrainian FPV to enable its launch point to be discovered. No...they obviously would follow it through the front lines.

Quantity Versus Quality

These are two great threads on how FPV drones are augmenting ATGM on the battlefield. TL:DR version: an FPV capable of disabling or destroying a tank or armored vehicle costs a couple of hundred dollars. A Javelin ATGM system runs around $178,000, with replacement missiles costing $78,000; even less sophisticated weapons will cost at least $20,000. Do the math.

Northern Front


Kharkiv

Kupiansk

Russian offensive activity seems to be winding down. There were seven reported attacks on this front. None of them gained ground.

This is what the front line looks like. The slashed gray areas are the "gray zone" or no-man's land.

Ukraine had one minor victory.

Donbas

The Russians continue strong attacks in this area. The operations around Bakhmut are focused on stopping the Ukrainian attempt to outflank Bakhmut to the south and force the Russians to abandon it. The operations at Adiivka are aimed at reducing the Ukrainian salient there and reclaiming a fortified area that has been in Ukrainian hands since the first Russian invasion in 2014.

Bahkmut-Klishchiivka-Andriivka

The main Russian focus remains north of Bakhmut, with the Russian Army making some small gains.

The Russians had less luck south of Bakhmut at Klishchiivka.

Adiivka

This fighting in this area continues to be intense. The best estimates are that the Russians have gained about 250 meters at the shoulders of the salient since their operation began in mid-October. This is a critical sector for both sides. If Russia can capture an area Ukraine has fortified since 2014, it will be a psychological blow in the way Bakhmut could never be. The Russians probably have committed more troops to the effort than Ukraine, but Ukraine has committed more tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery than Russia.

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Urozhaine-Vuhledar

Russia has increased combat operations in this sector in the last two weeks without significant gains.

Drone School Hit

I've previously posted on the ferocious war going on targeted drone operators; see  Putin's War, Week 86. The Very Resistible Force Meets the Immovable Object in Donbas and Putin's War, Week 88. Zelensky Is Blindsided by TIME Magazine and the Offensive Gets a Postmortem. This is another facet of this battlefield.

Partisan Activity

Southern Front

Zaporizhzhia

Robotyne-Verbove- Novoprokopivka;

This was the site of the main Ukrainian effort in the Spring Offensive. Operations are continuing, and the focus of Ukrainian attacks seems to be west of Robotyne rather than southwest of Verbove as they have been all summer. Russian milbloggers reported Russian airstrikes west of Robotyne in an area that had been thought to be under Russian control, indicating some Ukrainian progress.

Partisan Activity

Kherson

The slow-motion offensive in Kherson may have hit an unexpected sweet spot. The Ukrainian Spring Offensive drew away a lot of the forces defending Kherson Oblast south of the Dnieper River. The Ukrainian interdiction campaign against the rail lines running north from Crimea and east from Russia has made the supply situation perilous. The operational tempo to the east has restricted the resources available to the Russian occupation force in Kherson. All of this puts the Russian commander in Kherson in a very difficult position.

While the Ukrainians had been very quiet about this operation, last week, Zelensky and the Ukrainian military felt comfortable enough to place his prestige on the line by touting this offensive.

This is the frontline today, as best I can tell.

It is essential to notice that Russian counterattacks are coming from the east, not the south. This shows the inability of the Russians to confront the river crossings head-on.

A Russian withdrawal would make a lot of sense in light of the situation across the front.

A withdrawal to a defensible line, approximately where I've drawn the dotted line, could do a lot of things.

  1. The land bridge to Crimea would not be in greater danger than today.
  2. Crimea would be just as defensible as it is with the surrendered territory.
  3. The shorter line is more defensible and would have a higher troops and equipment density than today.
  4. The withdrawal would draw Ukrainian troops across the Dneiper and subject them to air and artillery attacks.
  5. The Ukrainians would be forced to install ribbon bridges across the Dneiper to support their advance, and these bridges would be logistical chokepoints that could restrict Ukraine's ability to sustain any significant offensive.

The downside, of course, is that the move would give aid and comfort to Ukraine, to the West, and the growing anti-war movement in Russia. Given the statements made on Russian television and the operational advantages of withdrawal versus the political downside, it would not be unreasonable for a plan of this kind to be in the works.

Russian Missile Attacks

Retaliation

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Rear Areas

Crimea

More Russian Ships Attacked

Partisans

Raids

Russia

FSB Border Troops Commander Ambushed

The target of the ambush was FSB Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Shafy, a senior border troops officer. You can read more about it at this link: Russian Volunteer Corps Fighting Against Kremlin Releases Video of Intelligence Officer Ambush (kyivpost.com).

Russian Military Base on Fire

This base has storage facilities for surface-to-air missiles and fuel.

Russian Explosive Plant of Fire

DEEP STRIKE: @officejjsmart reports that a UKR drone has struck a propellant and gunpowder factory near Kotovsk, Russia. The target was more than 300 KM (180 miles) from the Ukrainian frontier. Explosions are continuing. https://t.co/Xv6L9f1Gq5

Partisans

More On Russian Defense Industry Fires

In his substack, to which I don't subscribe because Phillips Obrien is a know-it-all-twatwaffle who I'll read for free but who I'll not pay, thinks this is the opening of a larger scale campaign by Ukraine targeting Russian production and transportation.

What's Next

I'm not sure either side can afford to take the winter off like they tried to do last year. The Ukrainian Army will not suffer in the field the way the Russians are going. The big thing to watch is any major change in the morale of either side. I think the proliferation of smartphones can create a perfect storm where the "folks back home" can get daily updates on how much things at the front suck. The phones also allow troops in many units to coordinate activities. 

There seem to be some cracks in the relationship between Zelensky and his commander-in-chief, that are open to exploitation given the right conditions. If the low-level sniping between the president's advisors and the military increases in volume, that will be a dangerous position for the Ukrainian war effort. 

Operationally, I think we can expect that the Russian offensives will burn themselves out with little to show for it. The big question is, did the Ukrainian command learn anything from the Spring Offensive, and will they have time to impart lessons to the troops in the field?



Streiff

Former infantry officer, CGSC grad and Army Operations Center alumnus. Also an amateur historian (Colonial America) and a dabbler in historical fiction.
RedState member since 2004. "He would rather pinch off his own head than admit he's wrong" -- Daily Kos. Follow me on Twitter. 

Read more by Streiff
Tags: RUSSIA UKRAINE PUTIN'S WAR

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