As seems to be the case each term, the Supreme Court kicks it into high gear in late June and issues a flurry of decisions, seemingly all at once. June of 2026 was no exception, so for these last few installments, we're just going to take them one day at a time.
The Court issued four decisions on June 25 — three of them were 6-3 decisions with Justice Samuel Alito at the helm and the Court's liberal bloc dissenting. The fourth decision was 7-2, with Justice Brett Kavanaugh authoring the opinion and the interesting pairing of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Ketanji Brown Jackson in dissent.
These cases covered Hawaii's so-called "Vampire Rule," asylum, Temporary Protected Status, and weed killer labeling. So, let's take a look.
Date: June 25, 2026
Author: Samuel Alito
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Kagan, Jackson, Sotomayor
Appeal From: 9th Circuit
Basic Facts:
For years, the State of Hawaii made it almost impossible to obtain a license to carry a firearm. Four years ago, however, this Court held in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to carry handguns outside the home for self-defense. Hawaii responded by replacing its old law on carry permits with new laws that achieved a similar result. At issue in this case is a Hawaii law that prohibits firearms on private property open to the public without the express and affirmative consent of the property owner. Hawaii’s new rule imposes severe restrictions on the daily activities of residents who have satisfied the State’s rigorous requirements for the issuance of a carry permit. When these permit holders leave home, not only must they take care to avoid all the territory where the possession of a gun is prohibited outright, but they may also be barred from entering many places that people routinely visit in the course of their daily routines, such as gas stations, restaurants, and stores. This law flips the default rule at common law, under which anyone has an implied license to enter property held open to the public unless the property owner withdraws consent.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, with the Amendment’s “central” concern being the fundamental right of self-defense. Id., at 577. Heller instructed courts to ascertain the scope of the right by looking to history and emphatically rejected an ahistorical “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry.’ ” Id., at 634. The Court later held in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, that the Second Amendment right applies equally to the Federal Government and the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, settling the question whether the Second Amendment embodies a uniform national standard or one that varies from one locale to another.
In Bruen, the Court fleshed out the process of historical analysis required in a Second Amendment case, holding that the analysis involves two steps. First, a court must determine whether the challenged law falls within the plain text of the Amendment’s language by asking whether the law applies to “the people” (i. e., all members of the political community) and restricts the “keep[ing]” (i. e., possession) or “bear[ing]” (i.e., carrying) of “Arms” (i. e., weapons customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes). If a challenged law falls within the plain text, it is presumptively unconstitutional—which means that it may violate the preexisting right that the Amendment codified. But the government may show that its challenged law did not infringe the historical understanding of the codified right. While a variety of sources may aid this inquiry, the best evidence is often what Bruen called historical analogues—old legal rules from which a court may draw a strong inference that the modern law at issue is consistent with the codified right. Bruen identified three important inquiries for evaluating proffered historical analogues: the number of jurisdictions in which they were adopted, the extent to which they were well-accepted, and whether any analogue or collection of analogues is “relevantly similar” to the modern law in terms of “how” and “why” it restricted the keeping or bearing of arms. 597 U. S., at 29.
Petitioners—three residents of Maui County who possess concealed-carry permits and an organizational plaintiff with members who have such permits—filed suit in federal court seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief, contending that the law at issue violates their constitutional rights. The District Court enjoined enforcement of the law as applied to private property open to the public, but the Ninth Circuit reversed that injunction.
Issue:
Can Hawaii prohibit licensed concealed-carry holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public unless the owner expressly gives permission?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Hawaii’s law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner’s express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
Skinny: Aloha, Hawaii. The Second Amendment isn’t optional — even in paradise.
SEE: In Wolford Decision Supreme Court Tosses Hawaii's Sweeping Concealed-Carry Restrictions
Date: June 25, 2026
Author: Samuel Alito
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson
Appeal From: 9th Circuit
Basic Facts:
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 66 Stat. 163, governs the process by which an alien who “arrives in the United States” is inspected by border officials, is deemed an applicant for admission, and may apply for asylum. The question in this case is when an alien who seeks to enter the United States from Mexico “arrives in the United States” within the meaning of that phrase in two key INA provisions—8 U. S. C. §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1): when the alien is standing in Mexico at the border, or only when the alien crosses the border and enters the country?
In the spring of 2016, U. S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began experiencing a surge of aliens seeking admission at ports of entry along the U. S.-Mexico border, with numbers sometimes far exceeding safe and secure processing capacity. In November 2016, the Department of Homeland Security responded by adopting a policy of “metering” the number of arriving aliens whom CBP would inspect each day and allow to apply for asylum. To enforce the policy, officials stood on the U. S. side of the border and prevented aliens from entering the United States beyond the number the port could adequately process. The metering policy continued through the change in Presidential administrations. In 2017, asylum seekers and the immigration-advocacy organization Al Otro Lado brought a putative class action against the Government in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing that CBP’s enforcement of the metering policy unlawfully withheld inspection and asylum processing from aliens who arrive at the border and seek to enter the United States. The District Court certified a class of all noncitizens who seek or will seek to access the asylum process by presenting themselves at certain ports on the U. S.-Mexico border and were or will be denied access to that process by CBP officials. The court granted summary judgment for the class and declared that the Government’s denial of inspection and asylum processing to class members who are in the process of arriving in the United States is unlawful regardless of the purported justification for doing so. The Government rescinded the metering policy in November 2021, shortly after the District Court entered summary judgment. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit then affirmed in relevant part, holding that an alien “arrives in the United States”—and thus must be inspected and may apply for asylum—when the alien, while standing on the Mexico side of the border, encounters a United States official at the border.
Issue:
Does someone standing on the Mexican side of the border count as having arrived in the United States, triggering the government’s duties to inspect them and allow them to apply for asylum?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
An alien standing in Mexico does not “arriv[e] in the United States” by attempting, and failing, to set foot in this country. An alien “arrives in the United States” only when he crosses the border. The INA thus neither entitles an alien standing in Mexico to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him.
Skinny: Close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades — not arriving in the United States.
SEE: Border Win: SCOTUS Rules Migrants in Mexico Haven't 'Arrived' in the US for Asylum Purposes
Mullin v. Doe (with Trump v. Miot)
Date: June 25, 2026
Author: Samuel Alito
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Kagan, Sotomayor, Jackson
Appeal From: 2nd Circuit and D.C. Circuit
Basic Facts:
The question presented is whether respondents, who challenge the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for aliens from Syria and Haiti, are entitled to orders postponing the terminations during litigation. Congress created TPS in 1990 to provide short-term humanitarian relief for aliens who cannot safely return to their home countries. Although designed to afford temporary relief, TPS designations in practice have often lasted for decades.
Syria received a TPS designation in 2012 because of “extraordinary and temporary conditions” related to the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad, 77 Fed. Reg. 19027, and in September 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security provided public notice that Syria’s TPS designation would terminate, 90 Fed. Reg. 45402. Seven Syrian nationals sued in the Southern District of New York asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to stop the termination. The District Court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to interim relief under 5 U. S. C. § 705. The Second Circuit denied the Government’s request for a stay.
Haiti received a TPS designation in 2010 after a devastating earthquake, 75 Fed. Reg. 3477, and in November 2025, the Secretary provided public notice that Haiti’s TPS designation would terminate, 90 Fed. Reg. 54739. Five Haitian nationals sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia asserting claims under the APA and charging that the termination of Haiti’s TPS designation violated the constitutional right to equal protection because it was motivated by race. The District Court granted interim relief, and a divided D. C. Circuit panel declined to issue a stay. The Government sought a stay and a writ of certiorari before judgment in both cases. This Court granted review, consolidated the cases, and deferred ruling on the stay applications.
Issue:
Can courts put the termination of temporary immigration protections for Syrians and Haitians on hold based on alleged statutory violations or racial discrimination?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
1. The TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims.
2. Miot respondents’ equal protection claim—that Haiti’s TPS designation was terminated because of race—is unlikely to succeed. Ironically, respondents themselves offer a race-neutral explanation for the Government’s action: namely, that the current administration, which has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for renewal, simply opposes the TPS program as it has been implemented in the past.
The Court assumes for the sake of argument that heightened scrutiny applies and that it must determine whether a “discriminatory purpose [was] a motivating factor in the decision” to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265–266. Because application of that standard calls for consideration of the context in which a challenged statement was made, id., at 267–268, the immigration context is an important factor.
None of the cited statements by either the President or the Secretary was overtly racial, and in substance all expressed policy views that could rest on race-neutral justifications. Viewing all the relevant evidence, Miot respondents are unlikely to prove that race was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, and it follows that they are not entitled to interim relief on their equal protection claim.
Skinny: “T” stands for “Temporary”—and Congress put the executive in charge of the clock.
SEE: SCOTUS Hands Trump Major Immigration Win - Says Courts Can't Second-Guess Most TPS Decisions
Date: June 25, 2026
Author: Brett Kavanaugh
Split: 7-2
Dissent: Jackson, Gorsuch
Appeal From: Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District
Basic Facts:
Monsanto Company manufactures and distributes Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide designed to control weeds. The EPA has repeatedly evaluated glyphosate and repeatedly concluded that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer. EPA’s assessment is shared by many other regulatory bodies around the world. In accordance with EPA’s view that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer in humans, EPA has not required labels on glyphosate-based pesticides like Roundup to include a cancer warning.
In 2019, John Durnell sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, alleging that he had used Monsanto’s Roundup products for about 20 years and that they had caused his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. As relevant here, Durnell brought a failure-to-warn tort claim, asserting that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. A jury agreed and awarded Durnell more than $1 million on the failure-to-warn theory. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, 707 S. W. 3d 828. The Court of Appeals rejected Monsanto’s argument that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act expressly preempted Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim, see 7 U. S. C. § 136v(b). This Court granted certiorari.
Issue:
Can a state-law lawsuit require Monsanto to put a cancer warning on Roundup’s label when the EPA-approved label does not include one?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to Roundup’s label.
Skinny: The EPA writes the labeling rules. A Missouri jury doesn’t get a Sharpie.
