Skinny on SCOTUS - Time Travel, Skinny Labels, and Ill-Gotten Gains

It's a veritable smorgasbord. 

Whitton v. Dixon

Date: June 1, 2026

Author: Per Curiam

Split: 7-2

Dissent: Thomas, Alito (except as to Part III-B)

Appeal From: 11th Circuit

Basic Facts:

During petitioner Gary Richard Whitton's murder trial, the State called a jailhouse informant named Jake Ozio, who testified that he overheard Whitton confess. Ozio also falsely testified that he had no criminal history prior to the arrest for which he was jailed with Whitton. Ozio's juvenile records showed he had previously been charged with assault with bodily injury, terroristic threats, and burglary. Whitton was convicted and sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully pursuing a direct appeal and state postconviction relief, he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Whitton argued that Ozio's criminal-history testimony was false, that the prosecution knew it was false because it possessed Ozio's juvenile records, and that there was a reasonable likelihood the testimony affected the jury's verdict, thereby violating his due process rights under Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150. Whitton further contended that federal habeas relief was warranted because the Giglio error had a “ ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’ ” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 623. The District Court denied relief, finding that any Giglio error could not have made a difference because Florida juvenile criminal records are generally inadmissible to attack a witness's credibility. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the District Court's harmlessness analysis, so it considered whether to affirm on the alternative ground that Whitton was not prejudiced because Ozio's testimony as a whole was immaterial to the jury's verdict. The Florida Supreme Court had determined during state postconviction proceedings that, even without Ozio's testimony, the evidence against Whitton was overwhelming. The Court of Appeals explained that, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, it owed deference to that determination unless it was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(2). In evaluating whether the state court's determination was reasonable, the Court of Appeals considered not only the evidence presented to the jury but also post-trial DNA evidence—a retest of blood stains on Whitton's boots conducted a decade after conviction that matched the victim's DNA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that even without Ozio's testimony there was overwhelming evidence against Whitton.

Issue:

When reviewing whether a state court reasonably found a trial error immaterial to the jury's verdict, can a federal habeas court rely on evidence that was discovered only after the trial and therefore never presented to the jury?

Holding: Vacated and remanded.

The Court of Appeals erred in considering post-trial DNA evidence when assessing whether the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that Ozio's testimony was immaterial to the jury's verdict, because evidence not presented to the jury could not have influenced the jury's verdict and therefore sheds no light on whether Ozio's testimony influenced that verdict. The Court of Appeals was required to assess whether the Florida Supreme Court's determination was reasonable in light of the evidence presented at trial.

Skinny: Try again, 11th Circuit — and this time, without considering evidence that would require the jury to time travel.

Allen v. Milligan

Date: June 2, 2026

Author: Per Curiam

Split: 6-3

Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson

Appeal From: Northern District of Alabama

Basic Facts:

In Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. 85, to resolve the tension between vote-dilution claims and the colorblind Constitution, the Court updated the standards for § 2 liability under Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30. As relevant here, the Court held that for plaintiffs to satisfy the first Gingles precondition, a plaintiff's alternative map “must meet all the State's legitimate districting objectives” “just as well” as the State's own map. Callais, 608 U. S., at 119 (emphasis added). Those objectives include “any other goal not prohibited by the Constitution.” Ibid. A plaintiff also “cannot use race as a districting criterion” in preparing the alternative map.” Ibid. And, to prove the second and third Gingles preconditions, a plaintiff “must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation” and “show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.” 608 U. S., at 119–120. After Callais, the Court vacated District Court injunctions that prevented Alabama from using a congressional map that it enacted in 2023. See Allen v. Caster, 608 U. S. –––. Two weeks after the injunctions were vacated, the District Court entered another injunction on largely the same grounds. State officials immediately applied to this Court for a stay of that injunction.

Issue:

Was Alabama entitled to a stay of the District Court's new injunction blocking its 2023 congressional map after SCOTUS had just vacated the earlier injunctions in light of its new Voting Rights Act standards in Louisiana v. Callais?

Holding: Applications granted.

At this preliminary stage, the State has shown that it is entitled to interim relief from the District Court's injunction. The State is likely to succeed on the merits as to both the intentional vote dilution and § 2 claims. As to the intentional vote-dilution claim, the District Court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith because it interpreted the State's legal disagreement with the court's earlier remedial order as proof of discriminatory animus. And, as to both claims, the District Court likely erred because it found a violation even though the plaintiffs' alternative map would not perform just as well as to the State's constitutionally permissible criteria of keeping together a community of interest and avoiding the pairing of incumbents. The District Court also failed to follow Callais' instruction that the mere fact that voters of different races vote for different parties is not relevant to proving racially polarized voting patterns. See 608 U. S., at 119–120. The State has also made a strong showing of irreparable harm and that the equities and public interest favor it. The Court has repeatedly cautioned that lower federal courts should not “alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 424 (per curiam). Here, the District Court interposed itself into Alabama's ongoing efforts to conduct its imminent 2026 congressional elections. Its view that conducting the elections under court-imposed maps would be more convenient for the State was not a valid justification for that intervention.

Skinny: Dear District Court: We changed the redistricting rules — you actually have to use them.

FCC v. AT&T

Date: June 4, 2026

Author: John Roberts

Split: 8-1

Dissent: Thomas

Appeal From: 5th Circuit (consolidated with Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, from the 2nd Circuit)

Basic Facts:

The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, authorizes the Federal Communications Commission to investigate regulated parties for suspected violations of the communications laws and to seek monetary forfeitures for violations of those laws. 47 U. S. C. § 503(b). In these cases, the Commission investigated cellular service providers AT&T and Verizon (collectively, the carriers) regarding their treatment of customer location data. Believing that the carriers had violated laws and regulations requiring them to take reasonable steps to keep location data confidential, the FCC sought forfeitures from the carriers. The Commission first issued the carriers notices of apparent liability under § 503(b)(4), which specified the factual and legal bases for the forfeitures the Commission sought. After reviewing the carriers' responses, the Commission “determined” that the carriers were liable and “assessed” penalties of roughly $57 million against AT&T and $47 million against Verizon. §§ 503(b)(1), (b)(2)(E).

Once the Commission issues an order, the recipient has two options. First, it may seek review in the court of appeals under the Hobbs Act. See 28 U. S. C. § 2342(1). The court of appeals, sitting without a jury, then reviews the order on the administrative record under the standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. 47 U. S. C. § 402(a); 28 U. S. C. § 2347(a); 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq., and § 701 et seq. The recipient may also opt to do nothing. In the event of nonpayment of a forfeiture penalty “determined under [§ 503(b)(4)],” the penalty “shall be recoverable . . . in a civil suit in the name of the United States.” 47 U. S. C. § 504(a). The Commission may then refer the matter to the Department of Justice, which in turn may—but need not—bring a civil suit within five years of the issuance of the order. 28 U. S. C. § 2462. That suit “shall be a trial de novo.” 47 U. S. C. § 504(a). The regulated party may, of course, pay the forfeiture voluntarily. But until it does, or the court in a § 504 enforcement action orders payment, the Commission may not use the “notice of apparent liability . . . to the prejudice of ” the party in other Commission proceedings. § 504(c).

Here, the carriers paid their penalties and filed petitions for review in their respective Courts of Appeals. They argued that requiring forfeiture without the opportunity for a jury trial violates the Seventh Amendment. The Fifth Circuit granted AT&T's petition for review and vacated the Commission's order. The court held that the FCC's enforcement procedures violate the Seventh Amendment because by the time the Commission issues a forfeiture order, it “has already found the facts, interpreted the law, adjudged guilt, and levied punishment”—all without the involvement of a jury. 149 F. 4th 491, 503. The Second Circuit denied Verizon's petition for review on the ground that the FCC's forfeiture order did not itself compel payment; the Department of Justice “needs to initiate a collection action” under § 504 before the carrier can be made to pay. 156 F. 4th 86, 106. The court thus held that the Commission does not violate the Seventh Amendment when it issues forfeiture orders without a jury. See id., at 107. This Court granted certiorari as to both decisions to resolve the conflict.

Issue:

Does the FCC violate the Seventh Amendment by determining that a regulated company violated federal law and assessing a monetary forfeiture without a jury, when the FCC cannot actually compel payment unless the government later brings — and wins — a de novo enforcement action in which a jury is available?

Holding: Reversed and remanded as to 5th Circuit; affirmed as to 2nd Circuit.

Because forfeiture orders issued under § 503(b)(4) do not definitively resolve the parties' legal obligations, and the FCC's factual findings in its forfeiture proceedings are not conclusive, it does not violate the Seventh Amendment for the Commission to issue forfeiture orders without the involvement of a jury.

Skinny: The FCC can call the foul, but it takes a jury to make the penalty stick.

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Date: June 4, 2026

Author: Neil Gorsuch

Split: 9-0

Dissent: N/A

Appeal From: 9th Circuit

Basic Facts:

Ongkaruck Sripetch engaged in numerous fraudulent schemes involving at least 20 penny-stock companies. On discovering the schemes, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action against Mr. Sripetch, charging him with six counts of securities fraud and one count of selling unregistered securities. Mr. Sripetch consented to the entry of judgment against him and agreed that the court could order disgorgement. When the SEC proceeded to seek over $4.1 million in disgorgement, however, Mr. Sripetch objected. He argued that the SEC's request violated Liu v. SEC, 591 U. S. 71, because the SEC lacked evidence that his schemes caused investors to suffer any financial losses. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected Mr. Sripetch's argument, deepening a split among the Courts of Appeals.

Issue:

Must the SEC prove that investors suffered an actual financial loss before it can obtain disgorgement of a securities fraudster's ill-gotten gains?

Holding: Affirmed.

A showing of pecuniary loss to investors is not required before the SEC may obtain a disgorgement award. 

Skinny: You don't get to keep your ill-gotten gains just because your victims can't show they lost money.

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.

Date: June 4, 2026

Author: Ketanji Brown Jackson

Split: 9-0

Dissent: N/A

Appeal From: Federal Circuit

Basic Facts:

Once the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved a new drug, federal law authorizes other manufacturers to seek approval for marketing generic versions so long as they do not infringe on any patented uses. All 50 States and the District of Columbia permit (or require) medical providers to substitute the brand-name drug with the cheaper generic version. Still, generic manufacturers may be subject to liability under federal law if they actively induce infringement of the brand manufacturer's patent. See 35 U. S. C. § 271(b).

Amarin Pharma, Inc. developed Vascepa, a drug containing the active ingredient icosapent ethyl. In 2012, the FDA approved Vascepa for the treatment of severe hypertriglyceridemia (the “SH indication”). In 2019, the FDA approved Vascepa for a second, more common use: reducing cardiovascular risk in hypertriglyceridemia patients who already take statins (the “CV indication”). Amarin obtained two method-of-use patents for this indication.

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., a generic drug manufacturer, submitted an abbreviated new drug application for generic icosapent ethyl in 2016. It initially filed a paragraph IV certification, see 21 U. S. C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), asserting that Amarin's SH-indication patents were invalid. After a district court invalidated Amarin's SH-indication patents, Hikma supplemented its application with a section viii statement, see § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), seeking approval of a skinny label that included only the SH indication and carved out Vascepa's still-patented CV-indication method of use. In 2020, the FDA approved Hikma's application with the skinny label and assigned an “AB” rating indicating therapeutic equivalence to Vascepa when used according to its labeling.

Amarin filed suit in the District of Delaware, alleging that Hikma actively induced others to infringe Amarin's CV-indication patents based on the totality of Hikma's statements across the skinny label, the patient information leaflet, Hikma's website, and its press releases. The District Court granted Hikma's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, explaining that none of these statements constituted active steps to encourage infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding it at least plausible that a physician could read the relevant statements as an instruction or encouragement to infringe.

Issue:

Did Amarin plausibly allege that Hikma actively induced infringement of Amarin's patented cardiovascular use of Vascepa based on Hikma's skinny label and related statements?

Holding: Reversed and remanded.

Amarin has failed to state a claim for active inducement in violation of § 271(b), so its complaint cannot withstand Hikma's motion to dismiss. The central question is whether Amarin plausibly alleged that Hikma actively encouraged infringing use, not merely whether doctors could plausibly read the alleged statements as instructions to infringe.

Skinny: Skinny label, skinny case: You need inducement, not innuendo.