Yes, friends, we finally made it — the last installment of Skinny on SCOTUS (for the 2024 term) is here. As is their wont, the Supreme Court wrapped up the season with a dramatic flourish.
Right out of the gate, they handed down the much-anticipated CASA decision regarding nationwide/universal injunctions. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 decision, and there was a great deal of acrimony seeping through between the majority opinion and the dissents — particularly Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson's.
All five of the June 27 decisions were 6-3 (though the configuration was only party-line in three of the five). The court punted on the long-awaited Louisiana redistricting/racial gerrymandering case.
READ MORE: Supreme Court Punts on Louisiana Racial Gerrymander Case, Setting Up Possible 2026 Midterm Chaos
And the court sneaked in a surprise Per Curiam decision on June 30 in a case involving a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claims.
Now...I said this was the last installment of the series (for now) because, of course, the court's 2024 term has ended. BUT...I have some additional "Skinny" ideas in the works, so don't be surprised if there are additional installments even before the court starts its 2025 term. In the meantime, let's wrap this up:
June 27, 2025 Decisions
Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton
Date: June 27, 2025
Author: Thomas
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Kagan, Sotomayor, Jackson
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
Texas, like many States, prohibits distributing sexually explicit content to children. In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, requiring certain commercial websites publishing sexually explicit content that is obscene to minors to verify that visitors are 18 or older. Knowing violations subject covered entities to injunctions and civil penalties.
Petitioners—representatives of the pornography industry—sued the Texas attorney general to enjoin enforcement of H. B. 1181 as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. They alleged that adults have a right to access the covered speech, and that the statute impermissibly hinders them. The Fifth Circuit held that an injunction was not warranted because petitioners were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. The court viewed H. B. 1181 as a “regulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials obscene for minors.” 95 F. 4th 263, 269, 271. It therefore determined that the law is not subject to any heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.
Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.
Holding: Affirmed.
H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults.
Skinny: Age verification on a porn site isn't a violation of the right to free speech. IOW, there's no First Amendment right to avoid age verification.
READ MORE: 1st Amendment: Supreme Court Rules on Free Speech Coalition vs. Paxton
Date: June 27, 2025
Author: Alito
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson
Appeal From: 4th Circuit
During the 2022–2023 school year, the Montgomery County Board of Education (Board) introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts into the public school curriculum. Those texts included five “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks approved for students in kindergarten through fifth grade, which have story lines focused on sexuality and gender. When parents in Montgomery County sought to have their children excused from instruction involving those books, the Board initially compromised with the parents by notifying them when the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks would be taught and permitting their children to be excused from the instruction. That compromise was consistent with the Board’s “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity,” which professed a commitment to making “reasonable accommodations” for the religious “beliefs and practices” of students. Less than a year after the Board introduced the books, however, it rescinded the parental opt out policy. Among other things, the Board said that it “could not accommodate the growing number of opt out requests without causing significant disruptions to the classroom environment.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 607a.
The petitioners here are a group of individual parents and an unincorporated association of other interested parties. The individual parents come from diverse religious backgrounds and hold sincere views on sexuality and gender which they wish to pass on to their children. Faced with the Board’s decision to rescind opt outs, petitioners filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Among other things, they asserted that the Board’s no-opt-out policy infringed on parents’ right to the free exercise of their religion. See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 524. They relied heavily on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, in which the Court recognized that parents have a right “to direct the religious upbringing oftheir children” and that this right can be infringed by laws that pose “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices that parents wish to instill in their children. Id., at 218, 233. Petitioners sought a preliminary and permanent injunction “prohibiting the School Board from forcing [their] children and other students—over the objection of their parents—to read, listen to, or discuss” the storybooks. App. to Pet. for Cert. 206a. The District Court denied relief, and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Do public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Parents challenging the Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction.
Skinny: Parents have a say in what their kids are taught/exposed to in school — they're entitled to notification and the option to opt out.
READ MORE: Supreme Court Upholds Right of Parents to Opt Their Kids Out of LGBTQ-Themed Classroom Activities
Date: June 27, 2025
Author: Kagan
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Gorsuch, Thomas, Alito
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) and instructed it to make available to “all the people of the United States,” reliable communications services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. §151. That objective is today known as “universal service.” The universal-service project rose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some population segments—such as the poor and those in rural areas—without access to needed communications services. Under the 1934 Act, the FCC pursued universal service primarily through implicit subsidies, using its rate-regulation authority to lower costs for some consumers at the expense of others.
In 1996, Congress amended the Act and created a new framework for achieving universal service. Section 254 of the amended statute requires every carrier providing interstate telecommunications services to “contribute” to a fund, known as the Universal Service Fund. See §254(d). The FCC must use the money in the Fund to pay for universal-service subsidy programs. See §§254(a), (d), (e). The statute designates the beneficiaries of universal-service subsidies—low-income consumers, those in rural areas, schools and libraries, and rural hospitals. §§254(b)(3), (h)(1), (j). And it provides detailed guidance regarding the communications services to which those beneficiaries should have access. In deciding what services to subsidize, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service is “essential to education, public health, or public safety” and has “been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers.” §§254(c)(1)(A)–(B). So too, the Commission must evaluate whether a service can be made available at an “affordable rate[].” §254(b)(1). Section 254 also sets forth “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” its universal-service policies. §254(b). Among other things, those principles direct that all consumers, “including low-income consumers” and those in “rural” areas, should have access to quality services at affordable prices. See ibid. The FCC also may add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” §254(b)(7).
To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” 47CFR §54.709(a). That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose numerator is the Fund’s projected quarterly expenses (the subsidy payments it will make plus overhead) and whose denominator is contributing carriers’ total projected quarterly revenue. §54.709(a)(2). A carrier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contribution factor. §54.709(a)(3).
The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private, not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund’s day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). Each quarter, the Administrator projects the Fund’s expenses, adds up revenue estimates it receives from carriers, and submits those figures to the Commission for approval and eventual use in calculating the contribution factor. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3).
In December 2021, the FCC set a 25.2% contribution factor for the first quarter of 2022. Consumers’ Research petitioned for review in the Fifth Circuit, contending that the universal-service contribution scheme violates the nondelegation doctrine. The en banc court granted the petition, replacing a panel decision to the contrary. See 109 F. 4th743; 63 F. 4th 441. In the full Fifth Circuit’s view, the combination of Congress’s delegation to the FCC and the FCC’s “subdelegation” to the Administrator violated the Constitution, even if neither delegation did so independently. 109 F. 4th, at 778.
- Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.
- Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.
- Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.
...
Under our nondelegation precedents, Congress sufficiently guided and constrained the discretion that it lodged with the FCC to implement the universal-service contribution scheme. And the FCC, in its turn, has retained all decision-making authority within that sphere, relying on the Administrative Company only for non-binding advice. Nothing in those arrangements, either separately or together, violates the Constitution.
Skinny: Congress can delegate to the FCC, provided it gives sufficient guidance, and the FCC can delegate to the Administrator, provided the FCC makes the final decisions. (Also known as the "Poop Rolls Downhill Principle.")
Added Note: I've never done much delving into the nondelegation doctrine, but this, from Justice Gorsuch's 36-page dissent, lands with me:
Today, the Court departs from these time-honored rules. When it comes to “universal service” taxes, the Court concludes, an executive agency may decide for itself what rates to apply and how much to collect. In upholding that arrangement, the Court defies the Constitution’s command that Congress “may not transfer to another branch ‘powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.’” (citations omitted)
Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.
Date: June 27, 2025
Author: Kavanaugh
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
In 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force, a body that formulates evidence-based recommendations regarding preventive healthcare services. Congress codified the Task Force’s role in 1999, establishing it as an entity within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in HHS’s Public Health Service. The Task Force currently consists of 16 volunteer members appointed by the Secretary of HHS to staggered 4-year terms. Before 2010, Task Force recommendations were purely advisory. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 changed this by requiring most health insurers and group health plans to cover without cost sharing those preventive services that receive “A” or “B” ratings from the Task Force. The Act also amended the governing statute to describe the Task Force as “independent” and to provide that members and their recommendations “shall be independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” 42 U. S. C.§§299b–4(a)(1), (6).
Plaintiffs, individuals and small businesses who object to the Affordable Care Act’s preventive-services coverage requirements, sued in federal court. Lead plaintiff Braidwood Management runs a health and wellness center offering insurance coverage to its approximately 70 employees through a self-insured plan. Plaintiffs argued that Task Force members are principal officers under the Appointments Clause who must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” Art. II, §2, cl. 2, not by the Secretary. The District Court agreed, recognizing that Task Force members are removable at will by the Secretary but concluding they are principal officers because they “have no superior” who supervises and directs them. 627 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646. While the Government’s appeal was pending, the Secretary in June 2023 ratified existing appointments made by the AHRQ Director and began personally appointing Task Force members. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding that while Task Force members are removable at will, they are not inferior officers because they cannot be “‘independent’” and “free from ‘political pressure’” while simultaneously being supervised by a political appointee. 104 F. 4th 930, 944
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Task Force members are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause.
...
Task Force members are inferior officers because their work is“directed and supervised” by the Secretary of HHS, a principal officer, through two main sources of authority.
Skinny: The Task Force survives (and the ACA still sucks). Also, if the agency leader can appoint you, can you at will, and block your recommendations, you're an inferior officer.
Date: June 27, 2025
Author: Barrett
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson
Appeal From: 4th Circuit/9th Circuit/1st Circuit
Plaintiffs (respondents here)—individuals, organizations, and States—filed three separate suits to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of President Trump’s Executive Order No. 14160. See Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449. The Executive Order identifies circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” and is thus not recognized as an American citizen. The plaintiffs allege that the Executive Order violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, §1, and §201 of the Nationality Act of 1940. In each case, the District Court entered a “universal injunction”—an injunction barring executive officials from applying the Executive Order to anyone, not just the plaintiffs. And in each case, the Court of Appeals denied the Government’s request to stay the sweeping relief. The Government argues that the District Courts lacked equitable authority to impose universal relief and has filed three nearly identical emergency applications seeking partial stays to limit the preliminary injunctions to the plaintiffs in each case. The applications do not raise—and thus the Court does not address—the question whether the Executive Order violates the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act. Instead, the issue the Court decides is whether, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts have equitable authority to issue universal injunctions.
Whether, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts have equitable authority to issue universal injunctions.
Holding: Applications for partial stays granted.
Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.
Skinny: Injunctions should be narrowly tailored, not universal. Also, the district courts need to get back in their lanes: "When a court concludes that the Executive Branch has acted unlawfully, the answer is not for the court to exceed its power, too."
READ MORE: Big: Supreme Court Rules on Nationwide Injunctions in Birthright Citizenship Cases
June 30, 2025 Decision
Date: June 30, 2025
Author: Per Curiam
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 4th Circuit
This case began when prison officials at the U. S. Penitentiary in Lee County, Virginia, ordered that plaintiff Andrew Fields be placed in solitary confinement. Prison officials monitored Fields while he was isolated. Fields alleges that during their periodic checks, officials would “physically abuse” him. Fields v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 109 F. 4th 264, 268 (CA4 2024).
Fields sued the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the prison warden, and several prison officials in federal court for damages, claiming that certain prison officials used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The U. S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed Fields’s complaint. As relevant here, the court determined that Fields lacked a cause of action under Bivens. Because “the Supreme Court has never ruled that a damages remedy exists for claims of excessive force by BOP officers against an inmate,” the District Court had “no difficulty in concluding that these claims arise in a new context” and that a Bivens remedy was unavailable. App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a; see id., at 45a–54a.
Fields appealed. In a divided decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed in relevant part, concluding that Fields could proceed with his Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim for damages. The Court of Appeals determined that no “special factors counseled against extending Bivens” here. 109F. 4th, at 270.
Judge Richardson dissented and stated: “A faithful application of our precedent and the Supreme Court’s leads squarely to the conclusion that we cannot create a new Bivens action here.” Id., at 283.
After the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, prison officials sought review in this Court, with the support of the United States as amicus curiae. We now grant the petition for certiorari and reverse.
- Whether an implied cause of action exists for Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims, and
- Whether the court should reconsider the premise that the judiciary may imply causes of action for damages under the federal Constitution that Congress did not enact.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at 490–491. We do the same here. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Skinny: You can't make an Eighth Amendment claim based on Fourth Amendment case law.
Added Note: The court briefly explains the history of Bivens in its order — the 1971 case "recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment." However, as the court points out, they've repeatedly declined since 1980 to extend the precedent to cover other constitutional violations.
You can check out prior installments of The Skinny on SCOTUS series here.
