With just about a month left and 35 opinions to go, the Supreme Court issued three more decisions on Thursday. It's likely they'll start having more than one decision day per week as we roll into June.
For this latest batch, we have two unanimous decisions and one 6-3 (split along party lines) — and believe it or not, the split decision isn't the one involving the NRA and the First Amendment. We'll have a more in-depth piece on that one, but in the meantime, the skinny on the latest:
May 30, 2024 Decisions
Date: May 30, 2024
Author: Alito
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson
Appeal From: Ninth Circuit
Basic Facts:
Respondent Danny Lee Jones was convicted of the premeditated first-degree murders of Robert and Tisha Weaver and the attempted premeditated murder of Robert’s grandmother Katherine Gumina. Arizona law at the time required the trial court to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one or more” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(E). The trial court found three aggravating circumstances that applied to both Robert’s and Tisha’s murders: Jones committed multiple homicides, §13–703(F)(8); he was motivated by “pecuniary” gain, §13–703(F)(5); and the murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved,” §13–703(F)(6). The trial court found an additional aggravating circumstance with respect to Tisha’s murder: she was a young child, §13–703(F)(9). The trial court also concluded that Jones had established four mitigating circumstances: long-term substance abuse, drug and alcohol impairment at the time of the murders, head trauma, and childhood abuse. 9 Record 2465. The court concluded that these mitigating circumstances were “not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” so it sentenced Jones to death. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after “review[ing] the entire record” and “independently weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.”
Jones later sought state postconviction review on the theory that defense counsel was ineffective, but the Arizona courts rejected Jones’s claims. Jones next filed a federal habeas petition in District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones could not show prejudice because the additional information he presented “ ‘barely. . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.’ ” Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 700). The Ninth Circuit reversed, but this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, it had been proper to consider the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See Ryan v. Jones, 563 U. S. 932. On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evidence and concluded that there was a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that “Jones would not have received a death sentence” if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. Jones v. Ryan, 52 F. 4th 1104, 1137. Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc review. One dissent, joined by eight judges, asserted that the Ninth Circuit panel flouted Strickland by crediting “questionable, weak, and cumulative mitigation evidence” as “enough to overcome . . . weight[y] . . . aggravating circumstances.” Id., at 1155.
Did the Ninth Circuit violate this Court's precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing Strickland prejudice when it disregarded the district court's factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the State's rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of Strickland was in error.
Skinny: This one gets deep into the criminal procedure weeds, but the bottom line is that the Ninth Circuit failed to follow Supreme Court precedent properly in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors in determining if the death penalty is appropriate in this case — and got smacked for it.
National Rifle Association v. Vullo
Date: May 30, 2024
Author: Sotomayor
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Second Circuit
Basic Facts:
Petitioner National Rifle Association (NRA) sued respondent Maria Vullo—former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS)—alleging that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy. The Second Circuit held that Vullo’s alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement. The Court granted certiorari to address whether the NRA’s complaint states a First Amendment claim.
The NRA’s “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679, are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage. DFS regulates insurance companies and financial services institutions doing business in New York, and has the power to initiate investigations and civil enforcement actions, as well as to refer matters for criminal prosecution. The NRA contracted with DFS-regulated entities—affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton)—to administer insurance polices the NRA offered as a benefit to its members, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s) would then underwrite. In 2017, Vullo began investigating one of these affinity insurance policies—Carry Guard—on a tip passed along from a gun-control advocacy group. The investigation revealed that Carry Guard insured gun owners from intentional criminal acts in violation of New York law, and that the NRA promoted Carry Guard without the required insurance producer license. Lockton and Chubb subsequently suspended Carry Guard. Vullo then expanded her investigation into the NRA’s other affinity insurance programs.
On February 27, 2018, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd’s, expressed her views in favor of gun control, and told the Lloyd’s executives “that DFS was less interested in pursuing” infractions unrelated to any NRA business “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.” App. to Pet. for Cert. at 199–200, ¶21. Vullo and Lloyd’s struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action solely on those syndicates which served the NRA.” Id., at 223, ¶69. On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued letters entitled, “Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organizations.” Id., at 246–251 (Guidance Letters). In the Guidance Letters, Vullo “encourage[d]” DFS-regulated entities to: (1) “continue evaluating and managing their risks, including reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; (2) “review any relationships they have with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; and (3) “take prompt actions to manag[e] these risks and promote public health and safety.” Id., at 248, 251. Vullo and Governor Cuomo also issued a joint press release echoing many of the letters’ statements, and “ ‘urg[ing] all insurance companies and banks doing business in New York’ ” to join those “ ‘that have already discontinued their arrangements with the NRA.’ ” Id., at 244. DFS subsequently entered into separate consent decrees with Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s, in which the insurers admitted violations of New York’s insurance law, agreed not to provide any NRA-endorsed insurance programs (even if lawful), and agreed to pay multimillion dollar fines.
1. Does the First Amendment allow a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government's own hostility to the speaker's viewpoint or (b) a perceived "general backlash" against the speaker's advocacy?
2. Does such coercion violate a clearly established First Amendment right?
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
The NRA plausibly alleged that respondent violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy.
Skinny: This isn't (yet) a win on the merits for the NRA, but it does mean that the NRA's suit adequately raises First Amendment issues and may go forward.
Date: May 30, 2024
Author: Kavanaugh
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Second Circuit
Basic Facts:
The United States maintains a dual system of banking. Banks with federal charters—called national banks—are subject primarily to federal oversight and regulation. Banks with state charters are subject to additional state oversight and regulation. As relevant here, the National Bank Act expressly grants national banks the power to administer home mortgage loans. 12 U. S. C. §371(a). When national banks make home mortgage loans, they often offer escrow accounts designed to protect both the bank and the borrower. Escrow accounts ensure the availability of funds to pay the insurance premium and property taxes on the borrower’s behalf. Escrow accounts operated by national banks are extensively regulated by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974. RESPA was designed to protect borrowers from “certain abusive practices” that were being carried on by national banks. §2601(a). But RESPA does not mandate that national banks pay interest to borrowers on the balances of their escrow accounts. New York state law is different. It provides that a bank “shall” pay borrowers “interest” on the balance held in an escrow account maintained in connection with a mortgage on certain real estate. N. Y. Gen. Oblig. Law Ann. §5–601.
In this case, petitioner Alex Cantero and petitioners Saul Hymes and Ilana Harwayne-Gidansky obtained home mortgage loans from Bank of America, a national bank chartered under the National Bank Act. Both contracts required the borrowers to make monthly deposits into escrow accounts. Bank of America did not pay interest on the balances held in either escrow account, but informed the borrowers that the New York interest-on-escrow law was preempted by the National Bank Act. The borrowers brought putative class-action suits in Federal District Court. The District Court concluded that nothing in the National Bank Act or other federal law preempted the New York law. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that because the New York law “would exert control over” national banks’ power “to create and fund escrow accounts,” the law was preempted
Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
The Second Circuit failed to analyze whether New York’s interest-on-escrow law is preempted as applied to national banks in a manner consistent with Dodd-Frank and Barnett Bank.
Skinny: Again, not an outright win for the petitioners, but a reversal of the lower court for failing to apply the right standard in determining whether New York's law mandating interest on escrow accounts significantly interferes with the national bank's exercise of its powers. Basically, the Second Circuit needs to take another look and follow the proper standard set forth in Dodd-Frank (which incorporated the Barnett ruling).
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