With 38 decisions still to hand down in the 2023 term, the U.S. Supreme Court has its work cut out for it between now and the end of June — something I briefly discussed with Zack Smith, Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, on Wednesday afternoon as I co-hosted the "Tim Jones and Chris Arps Show" on NewsTalkSTL.
On Thursday, they made a small dent in that pile of remaining cases, handing down three more decisions. This grouping includes one unanimous decision and two 6-3 splits, the most notable being their decision involving redistricting in South Carolina (and claims of racial vs. political jerrymandering).
READ MORE:
SCOTUS Upholds South Carolina GOP-Redistricting Map
All three decisions are a bit wonky/in the weeds, but will do my best to pare them down to the nitty-gritty.
May 23, 2024 Decisions
Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP
Date: May 23, 2024
Author: Alito
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Kagan, Sotomayor, Jackson
Appeal From: District Court - South Carolina
Basic Facts:
Following the 2020 Census, South Carolina was tasked with redrawing its congressional district maps because of population shifts in two of its seven districts—Districts 1 and 6. The State Senate subcommittee responsible for drawing the new map issued a statement explaining that the process would be guided by traditional districting principles along with the goal of creating a stronger Republican tilt in District 1. To draw the new maps, the Senate turned to Will Roberts, a nonpartisan staffer with experience in drawing reapportionment plans. Roberts’ plan (the Enacted Plan) achieved the legislature’s political goal by increasing District 1’s projected Republican vote share by 1.36% to 54.39%. The plan also raised the black voting-age population (BVAP) from 16.56% to 16.72%. The legislature adopted the plan, and the Governor signed it into law.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and District 1 voter Taiwan Scott (Challengers), challenged the plan, alleging that it resulted in racial gerrymanders in certain districts and in the dilution of the electoral power of the State’s black voters. The three-judge District Court held that the State drew District 1 with a 17% BVAP target in mind in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that this putative use of race to draw District 1 unlawfully diluted the black vote
1. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent?
2. Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case?
3. Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics?
4. Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles?
5. Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data?
6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
1. The District Court’s finding that race predominated in the design of District I in the Enacted Plan was clearly erroneous.
...
2. Because the same findings of fact and reasoning that guided the court’s racial-gerrymandering analysis also guided the analysis of the Challengers’ independent vote-dilution claim, that conclusion also cannot stand. The District Court also erred in conflating the two claims. A plaintiff pressing a vote-dilution claim cannot prevail simply by showing that race played a predominant role in the districting process, but rather must show that the State “enacted a particular voting scheme as a purposeful device to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities.” Miller, 515 U. S., at 911. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the State’s districting plan “has the purpose and effect” of diluting the minority vote. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 649. In light of these two errors in the District Court’s analysis, a remand is appropriate.
Skinny:
While racial jerrymandering (drawing lines based on race) is not okay, political jerrymandering (drawing lines based on party preference) is. When there's a high correlation between race and party preference, challengers have to prove the legislature was motivated by race, not party — and the legislature is entitled to the presumption that it is acting in good faith.
Brown v. United States (consolidated with Jackson v. United States)
Date: May 23, 2024
Author: Alito
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Jackson, Kagan, Gorsuch
Appeal From: Third Circuit
Basic Facts:
These cases concern the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act to state drug convictions that occurred before recent technical amendments to the federal drug schedules. ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on defendants who are convicted for the illegal possession of a firearm and who have a criminal history thought to demonstrate a propensity for violence. As relevant here, a defendant with “three previous convictions” for “a serious drug offense” qualifies for ACCA’s enhanced sentencing. 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). For a state crime to qualify as a “serious drug offense,” it must carry a maximum sentence of at least 10 years’ imprisonment, and it must “involv[e] . . .a controlled substance . . . as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act.” §§924(e)(1), (2)(A)(ii).
Under the categorical approach, a state drug offense counts as an ACCA predicate only if the State’s definition of the drug in question “matche[s]” the definition under federal law. Shular v. United States, 589 U. S. 154, 158. The question presented is whether a state crime constitutes a “serious drug offense” if it involved a drug that was on the federal schedules when the defendant possessed or trafficked in it but was later removed.
Petitioners Justin Rashaad Brown and Eugene Jackson were separately convicted of the federal crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of §922(g)(1). In both cases, an ACCA enhancement was recommended based on prior state felony drug convictions. And both defendants argued that their prior convictions did not qualify as “serious drug offense[s].”
Brown’s presentence report identified several Pennsylvania drug convictions, including four convictions for possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. At the time of Brown’s marijuana convictions, the federal and Pennsylvania law definitions of marijuana matched. But while Brown’s federal §922(g)(1) charge was pending, Congress modified the federal definition of marijuana. Because the federal and state definitions did not fully match when Brown was sentenced, Brown argued that his marijuana convictions no longer qualified as “serious drug offense[s]” for purposes of the ACCA sentencing enhancement.
Jackson’s presentence report identified several prior Florida convictions, including convictions in 1998 and 2004 for possession and distribution of cocaine. In 2015, the Federal Government amended the federal definition of cocaine, so the federal and Florida definitions no longer matched when Jackson committed his §922(g)(1) offense. Like Brown, Jackson argued that these prior convictions no longer qualified as “serious drug offense[s].” In both cases, the District Courts disagreed and sentenced petitioners to enhanced sentences, and the respective appellate courts ultimately affirmed.
Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach?
Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense (as the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held), or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense (as the Eleventh Circuit held below).
Holding: Affirmed.
A state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction.
Skinny:
Trial courts should look to the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the state conviction to determine if a sentencing enhancement applies.
Date: May 23, 2024
Author: Jackson
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Ninth Circuit
Basic Facts:
The dispute here involves a conflict between two contracts executed by petitioner Coinbase, Inc., operator of a cryptocurrency exchange platform, and respondents, who use Coinbase. The first contract—the Coinbase User Agreement that respondents agreed to when they created their accounts—contains an arbitration provision with a delegation clause. Per this provision, an arbitrator must decide all disputes under the contract, including whether a given disagreement is arbitrable. The second contract—the Official Rules for a promotional sweepstakes respondents entered—contains a forum selection clause providing that California courts “shall have sole jurisdiction of any controversies regarding the [sweepstakes] promotion.” Respondents ultimately filed a class action in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the sweepstakes violated various California laws. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration based on the User Agreement’s delegation clause. The District Court determined that the Official Rules’ forum selection clause controlled the parties’ dispute and accordingly denied the motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, should an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?
Holding: Affirmed.
Where parties have agreed to two contracts—one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts—a court must decide which contract governs.
Skinny:
Where different contracts between parties have different provisions regarding arbitration, a court will decide which provision applies. In other words, tie goes to the runner (court).
READ MORE:
Skinny on SCOTUS - 5/16/24 Edition: The CFPB Survives
Skinny on SCOTUS - 5/9/24 Edition - Forfeiture and Copyright
The Skinny on SCOTUS (2023 Term - December-February)
The Skinny on SCOTUS (2023 Term - March)
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