On January 23, the Department of War released the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Mainstream media outlets were quick to misrepresent the document, claiming that the Pentagon has shifted away from treating China as a top threat.
Homeland defense is the NDS’s number one priority, with deterring China in the Indo-Pacific as a close second. However, this doesn't mean that the Pentagon no longer views China as a top threat. In multiple places, the document mentions China alongside homeland defense, suggesting that the two are equally critical to the Pentagon.
President Trump’s corollary to the long-overlooked Monroe Doctrine is undoubtedly rooted in countering Chinese influence. Venezuela and Cuba have served as beachheads for Beijing. Greenland and the Panama Canal are vital to U.S. national security. Panama’s Supreme Court recently voided Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison’s port contracts in the canal — a major victory for hemispheric security. And as part of its unrestricted warfare, China readily weaponizes drugs and migration in an attempt to weaken the U.S.
Leaving the homeland and the Western Hemisphere exposed to the influence of China and other foreign adversaries would undercut Washington’s ability to deter effectively overseas. It would undermine the security of key regional allies.
The NDS emphasizes deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain (FIC) to ensure that China or another country does not dominate the region. This draws on Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby’s strategy of denial that aims to protect U.S. interests.
Though Taiwan isn't directly mentioned in the document, as many critics have pointed out, it’s implicit, given that the self-governing island is a key node in the FIC. The 2025 National Security Strategy, which mentioned the island multiple times, acknowledged the centrality of Taiwan to the FIC. Because of its strategic importance, the administration is certain to continue arms sales to Taipei (four U.S. arms deals are “in the pipeline,” according to Taiwan officials). The U.S.-Taiwan security relationship is growing stronger by the day.
Some critics argue that the 2026 NDS doesn't explain how the U.S. will establish a denial defense along the FIC or support Taiwan. But this critique raises a fundamental question: Why should Washington spell out every element of its defense strategy in a way that enables adversaries to prepare accordingly? In this context, ambiguity is a feature, not a flaw.
While regional allies and partners are expected to increase military spending for the sake of collective defense (i.e., burden-sharing), the document articulates a strategy in which the U.S. will remain very much involved in deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. It specifically calls on South Korea to assume a central role in deterring North Korea, with the U.S. offering “critical but more limited support.”
This is a clear indication that the administration views China as a threat and is concerned about a Taiwan contingency and increasing Chinese aggression in other parts of the region, namely the South China Sea. It will enable U.S. forces to maintain a more flexible position in the Western Pacific.
In addition to deterrence and burden-sharing, the NDS seeks to de-escalate tensions with China where possible. The intention is to manage crises and prevent a conflict from spiraling into a costly war. American strength and readiness, not confrontation, are the guiding principles — a purely realist strategy.
To achieve this, the NDS states that the Department of War will look for ways to expand military-to-military communication channels with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), consistent with the 2025 China Military Power Report. It also holds that a decent peace, a concept first outlined by Colby, “on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under, is possible.” A decent peace refers to a favorable balance of power, not regime change or humiliation, “where trade flows openly and fairly, we can all prosper, and our [America’s] interests are respected.”
Many have suggested this signals a shift toward accommodating Beijing. That isn’t the case, though.
A decent peace isn’t carte blanche for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to misbehave. Rather, it’s a concept based on conditions, one being respect for America’s interests in the region — in other words, no Chinese regional hegemony. This is sure to be met with resistance from Beijing, considering that establishing denial defense along the FIC clashes with the CCP’s territorial claims that are framed in tenuous historical terms and as “unstoppable.”
Administration officials have issued statements condemning Chinese aggression time and time again. The administration certainly isn’t oblivious to Beijing’s expansionist agenda, as some are implying.
The Trump administration’s willingness to act if peace is outrightly rejected by adversaries shouldn’t be underestimated. The NDS makes clear that if deterrence fails, U.S. forces will be prepared to fight and win wars. This is a simple and clear warning that the CCP should heed. There will be consequences.
We know that wishing for a decent peace is not the same thing as bringing it about. Thus, if our potential opponents are unwise enough to reject our peaceful overtures and choose conflict instead, America’s armed forces will stand ready to fight and win the nation’s wars in ways that make sense for Americans.
America isn’t in retreat, and neither is it willing to cede the Indo-Pacific to Chinese hegemony; the NDS makes clear that Beijing must be checked. Deterrence is the cornerstone of the administration’s security strategy in the region. The U.S. will continue strengthening its military partnerships and alliances throughout the Indo-Pacific, along with rebuilding its defense industrial base, to counter the China threat in what the document refers to as “the world’s economic center of gravity.” It’s the administration’s actions, not words, that matter in the end.
