Things are starting to pick up at the Supreme Court as we head into the closing months of the 2025 term. The Court has handed down 20 decisions so far this term, five of those in February. The big one, of course, was the tariff case(s) — one that did not go the way the Trump administration was hoping. That one was a split decision (6-3), as was the next one, involving liability of the U.S. Postal Service for intentionally "lost" mail — that one resulted in a 5-4 split.
The remainder of the February decisions were unanimous and involved questions of federal diversity jurisdiction, derivative sovereign immunity for federal contractors, and criminal procedure.
Here's the rundown of February's decisions:
Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump
Date: February 20, 2026
Author: Roberts
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Thomas, Kavanaugh, Alito
Appeal From: D.C Circuit/Federal Circuit
The question presented is whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose tariffs. See 91 Stat. 1626. Shortly after taking office, President Trump sought to address two foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China, Presidential Proclamation No. 10886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327; Exec. Order No. 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113; Exec. Order No. 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117; Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121, and “large and persistent” trade deficits, Exec. Order No. 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041. The President determined that the drug influx had “created a public health crisis,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113, and that the trade deficits had “led to the hollowing out” of the American manufacturing base and “undermined critical supply chains,” id., at 15041. The President declared a national emergency as to both threats, deeming them “unusual and extraordinary,” and invoked his authority under IEEPA to respond.
He imposed tariffs to deal with each threat. As to the drug trafficking tariffs, the President imposed a 25% duty on most Canadian and Mexican imports and a 10% duty on most Chinese imports. Id., at 9114, 9118, 9122–9123. As to the trade deficit (“reciprocal”) tariffs, the President imposed a duty “on all imports from all trading partners” of at least 10%, with dozens of nations facing higher rates. Id., at 15045, 15049. Since imposing each set of tariffs, the President has issued several increases, reductions, and other modifications.
Petitioners in Learning Resources and respondents in V.O.S. Selections filed suit, alleging that IEEPA does not authorize the reciprocal or drug trafficking tariffs. The Learning Resources plaintiffs—two small businesses—sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That court denied the Government’s motion to transfer the case to the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that IEEPA did not grant the President the power to impose tariffs. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs—five small businesses and 12 States—sued in the CIT. That court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. And the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed in relevant part, concluding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate . . . importation” did not authorize the challenged tariffs, which “are unbounded in scope, amount, and duration.” 149 F. 4th 1312, 1338. The Government filed a petition for certiorari in V.O.S. Selections, and the Learning Resources plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before judgment. The Court granted the petitions and consolidated the cases.
Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The judgment in No. 24–1287 is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; the judgment in No. 25–250 is affirmed.
Skinny: Emergency powers aren’t an end-around to the tariff code.
Added Note: The Court did not weigh in on the wisdom of the tariffs – only on who has the authority to impose them, or, more specifically, whether the president has that authority under this particular statute. The majority’s reasoning here fits within a broader pattern of insisting that major economic and political decisions require clear congressional authorization. (But see Justice Kavanaugh's dissent for a strong counterargument.)
READ MORE: Breaking: Supreme Court Says No to Tariffs by Emergency Decree
Read It: Kavanaugh Goes Off on Fellow Justices in Blazing Dissent, Calls Tariff Decision 'Illogical'
Date: February 24, 2026
Author: Thomas
Split: 5-4
Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Jackson
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
Respondent Lebene Konan and the local post office in Euless, Texas, had an extended dispute concerning mail delivery to two rental properties owned by Konan. Konan alleged that, among other things, United States Postal Service employees intentionally withheld her mail and interfered with its delivery. After administrative complaints proved unsuccessful, Konan sued the United States in federal court, bringing various state-law tort claims alleging that the United States Postal Service intentionally and wrongfully withheld her mail. The District Court dismissed Konan’s complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act’s postal exception, under which the United States retains sovereign immunity for all claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter,” 28 U. S. C. §2680(b). The District Court concluded that the United States enjoys sovereign immunity from Konan’s claims because they all relate to personal or financial harms arising from nondelivery of mail. The District Court further held that the postal exception is not limited to merely negligent failure to properly carry the mail. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the terms “loss,” “miscarriage,” and “negligent transmission” do not encompass the intentional act of not delivering the mail at all. In contrast, the First and Second Circuits have interpreted the postal exception to apply to suits even when they arise from harms caused by intentional misconduct. The Court granted certiorari to resolve the split.
Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional nondelivery of mail because both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the FTCA’s postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail.
Skinny: Even if it’s on purpose, lost mail is still “lost” – and the government can’t be sued for it under the present statutory scheme.
Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist
Date: February 24, 2026
Author: Sotomayor
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
Respondents Sarah and Grant Palmquist fed their child E. P. baby food that was made by petitioner Hain Celestial Group, Inc., and that they purchased from petitioner Whole Foods Market, Inc. When E. P. was 2½ years old, he began exhibiting serious developmental disorders and was diagnosed with a range of physical and mental conditions that some doctors attributed to heavy-metal poisoning. In 2021, a subcommittee of the U. S. House of Representatives released a staff report finding that certain baby foods, including Hain’s, contained elevated levels of toxic heavy metals. Following the report’s release, the Palmquists sued both Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court, alleging state-law product liability and negligence claims against Hain, and state-law breach-of-warranty and negligence claims against Whole Foods. Hain, a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in New York, removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, but confronted a problem: Federal courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction only when no adverse party is from the same State, but Whole Foods and the Palmquists are all Texas citizens. As a result, the District Court lacked jurisdiction as the case stood upon removal. Hain sought to cure this problem by arguing in its notice of removal that Whole Foods had been improperly joined in the lawsuit and should be dismissed, which would have established complete diversity between Hain and the Palmquists. The District Court agreed with Hain, dismissed Whole Foods, and denied the Palmquists’ motion to remand. The case then went to trial against Hain alone in federal court. The District Court granted Hain’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, explaining that the Palmquists had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove causation. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s improper joinder decision and dismissal of Whole Foods. Because Whole Foods had been improperly dismissed, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the District Court lacked diversity jurisdiction, that the District Court’s judgment had to be vacated, and that the case had to be remanded to state court. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a divide among the Courts of Appeals on whether vacatur is required in these circumstances.
- Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.
- Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.
Holding: Affirmed and remanded.
Because the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of Whole Foods did not cure the jurisdictional defect that existed when this case was removed to federal court, the Fifth Circuit correctly vacated the judgment in Hain’s favor.
Skinny: A judgment in the wrong court is no judgment at all.
Date: February 25, 2026
Author: Kagan
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 10th Circuit
Petitioner GEO Group operates a private detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, under a contract with U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Respondent Alejandro Menocal, a former detainee at the Aurora facility, initiated this class action, alleging GEO’s work policies for detainees violate a federal bar on forced labor and Colorado’s prohibition on unjust enrichment. GEO responded that the suit must be dismissed under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U. S. 18, which held that a federal contractor cannot be held liable for conduct that the Government has lawfully “authorized and directed” the contractor to perform. Id., at 20–21. GEO argued that ICE had authorized and directed it to carry out the challenged labor policies. But the District Court did not read GEO’s contract with the Government to instruct GEO to adopt those policies. The District Court thus concluded that the Yearsley doctrine did not relieve GEO of legal responsibility and a trial would be necessary. GEO immediately filed an appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order denying Yearsley protection does not qualify for interlocutory review under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541.
Whether an order denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
Holding: Affirmed and remanded.
Because Yearsley provides federal contractors a potential merits defense rather than an immunity from suit, a pretrial order denying Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable.
Skinny: Government contractors don’t get a fast-pass appeal just by invoking Uncle Sam.
Added Note: This decision reinforces the notion that immediate/expedited appeals are the exception, rather than the rule.
Date: February 25, 2026
Author: Jackson
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
David Villarreal’s murder trial culminated with his own testimony. That testimony was interrupted by a 24-hour overnight recess, during which the trial judge instructed Villarreal’s attorneys not to “manage his testimony.” 707 S. W. 3d 138, 142. The judge clarified, however, that Villarreal was not prohibited from talking to his attorneys and recognized Villarreal’s constitutional right to confer about certain topics, such as possible sentencing issues. Villarreal resumed his testimony 24 hours later and was subsequently convicted of murder. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the order was a permissible exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.
Holding: Affirmed.
A qualified conferral order that prohibits only discussion of the defendant’s testimony for its own sake during a midtestimony overnight recess permissibly balances the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the burden of offering unaltered trial testimony and does not violate the Constitution.
Skinny: You can talk to your lawyer overnight/mid-testimony — just not about how to tweak your testimony.
You can check out prior installments of The Skinny on SCOTUS series here.
