Alright...we've rounded the bend and are in the home stretch now for the Supreme Court's 2024 term. (Yes, the court rounded the bend two weeks ago — I'm slowly, but surely, catching up.) In this batch of decisions, we've got notable splits, rather than unanimity: two 6-3 decisions; two 5-4 decisions. And we've got immigration, post-conviction DNA testing, standing to sue over Medicaid funding, and the First Step Act in the mix.
Let's take a look:
June 26, 2025 Decisions
Date: June 26, 2025
Author: Alito
Split: 5-4
Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson, Gorsuch
Appeal From: 4th Circuit
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, the DHS issued a “final administrative review order” (FARO) directing Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Under 8 U. S. C. §1228(b)(3), aliens may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration officer that he would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Jamaica. The officer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and concluded that Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which prohibits removal to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley’s case to a “withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could be removed to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the IJ’s order and allowed the FARO’s enforcement. Three days later, Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1) aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” proceedings by filing within 30 days of that decision, and (2) §1252(b)(1)’s 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claims-processing rule.
- Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.
- Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision.
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
- BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” proceedings are not “final order[s] of removal” under §1252(b)(1).
- The 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.
Skinny: Pierre gets another shot — not at challenging his removal, but at challenging his removal back to Jamaica.
Added Note: This one is tricky because the government essentially sided with Riley, and the whole issue of timing and what can be challenged when is...well, frankly, confusing. The ultimate conclusion I reached attempting to digest this decision is that Congress probably needs to amend the pertinent statutory provisions to clarify whether the deadline in question is jurisdictional and the proper mechanism for an alien to appeal a decision as to where he can be removed. It's murky. (And we're watching a lot of this murkiness play out in real time with all of the immigration decisions/challenges under the current administration. Look for this decision to be cited in some way as the case of Kilmar Abrego Garcia lands in the 4th Circuit.)
Date: June 26, 2025
Author: Sotomayor
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
In 1998, Texas charged Ruben Gutierrez with capital murder for his involvement in the killing of Escolastica Harrison. The State’s theory at trial was that Gutierrez wielded one of the two screwdrivers used to stab Harrison to death in her mobile home. The jury convicted Gutierrez of capital murder. At the sentencing phase of Gutierrez’s trial, the jury was required to answer whether Texas proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Gutierrez “actually caused” Harrison’s death or, if not, “that he intended to kill [her]” or “anticipated that a human life would be taken.” Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(2)(b)(2).The jury answered yes, and Gutierrez was sentenced to death.
For nearly 15 years, Gutierrez has sought DNA testing of evidence he claims would prove he was not in Harrison’s home the night of the murder. Texas’s Article 64 allows DNA testing where a “convicted person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence” that he “would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing,” among other criteria. Art. 64.03(a)(2)(B). Invoking Article 64, Gutierrez twice moved in state court for DNA testing of untested crime scene evidence. The trial court denied his first request in 2010, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed. The court reasoned that even if Gutierrez’s DNA was not found on the tested items, that would not establish his innocence of capital murder because he would still be a party to the robbery that resulted in Harrison’s death. The court concluded that Gutierrez could not use Article 64 to show he was wrongly sentenced to death unless he could also establish his innocence of the underlying crime. In 2019, Gutierrez again sought DNA testing, but Texas courts denied his motion. On appeal, the TCCA reiterated that DNA testing was not available to show only death penalty ineligibility.
Gutierrez then filed suit in federal court under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against Luis Saenz, the district attorney who has custody of the untested evidence. Gutierrez argued that Texas’s DNA testing procedures violated his liberty interests in utilizing state postconviction procedures. The District Court agreed and granted declaratory relief, finding it fundamentally unfair that Texas gives prisoners the right to challenge their death sentence through habeas petitions but prevents them from obtaining DNA testing to support those petitions unless they can establish innocence of the underlying crime. The Fifth Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and held that Gutierrez lacked standing to bring his §1983 suit, finding that his claimed injury was not redressable because a declaratory judgment would be unlikely to cause the prosecutor to “reverse course and allow testing.” 93 F. 4th267, 272.
Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Gutierrez has standing to bring his §1983 claim challenging Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.
Skinny: Ruben, too, gets another bite at the apple, sort of. Regardless of whether there may be other justifications for the prosecutor to withhold DNA testing, he still has standing to contend that his due process rights have been violated.
Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic
Date: June 26, 2025
Author: Gorsuch
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Jackson, Sotomayor, Kagan
Appeal From: 4th Circuit
Congress created Medicaid in 1965 to subsidize state healthcare for families and individuals “whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.” §1396–1. Medicaid offers States “a bargain”: federal funds in exchange for compliance with congressionally imposed conditions. To participate in Medicaid, States must submit a “plan for medical assistance” satisfying over 80 conditions in §1396a(a). If a State fails “to comply substantially” with any condition, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may withhold federal funding. §1396c. This case involves the any-qualified-provider provision in §1396a(a)(23)(A), which requires States to ensure that “any individual eligible for medical assistance . . . may obtain” it “from any [provider] qualified to perform the service . . . who undertakes to provide” it. The provision does not define “qualified,” leaving that to States’ traditional authority over health and safety matters. The question is whether individual Medicaid beneficiaries may sue state officials under 42 U. S. C. §1983 for failing to comply with the any-qualified-provider provision.
Planned Parenthood South Atlantic operates two clinics in South Carolina, offering a wide range of services to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. It also performs abortions. Citing state law prohibiting public funds for abortion, South Carolina in July 2018 determined that Planned Parenthood could no longer participate in the State’s Medicaid program. At the same time, the State took steps that, it said, would help ensure that other providers would continue offering necessary medical care and family planning services. Planned Parenthood and patient Julie Edwards sued, claiming the exclusion of Planned Parenthood violated the any-qualified-provider provision. Edwards alleged she preferred Planned Parenthood for gynecological care but needed Medicaid coverage. They brought a §1983 class action “to vindicate rights secured by the federal Medicaid statutes.”
Section 1983 allows private parties to sue state actors who violate their “rights” under the federal “Constitution and laws.” But federal statutes do not automatically confer §1983-enforceable “rights.” This is especially true of spending-power statutes like Medicaid, where “the typical remedy” for violations is federal funding termination, not private suits. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 280.
The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and enjoined the exclusion. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. This Court then granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded in light of Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, 599 U. S. 166, which addressed whether another spending-power statute created §1983-enforceable rights. On remand, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed.
- Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.
- What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under §1983.
Skinny: Julie doesn't have an individual right to sue the state for determining that Planned Parenthood isn't eligible to participate in its Medicaid program. (Whether or not a state is in compliance with Medicaid statutes is between the state and federal government to sort out — not individuals.)
Date: June 26, 2025
Author: Jackson
Split: 5-4
Dissent: Alito, Thomas, Kavanaugh, Barrett
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
Before the First Step Act was enacted in 2018, federal judges were required to sentence first-time offenders convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—a law that criminalizes possessing a firearm while committing other crimes—to “stacked” 25-year periods of incarceration. The First Step Act eliminated this harsh mandatory minimum penalty. Section 403(b) of the Act also made its more lenient penalties partially retroactive. Specifically, if a sentence “has not been imposed” upon an eligible §924(c) offender as of the date of the First Step Act’s enactment, the Act applies. The question presented here concerns an edge case: What penalties apply when a §924(c) offender had been sentenced as of the Act’s enactment, but that sentence was subsequently vacated, such that the offender must face a post-Act resentencing?
In 2009, petitioners Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Rosswere convicted of multiple counts of bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, along with corresponding §924(c) offenses for use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Each petitioner received a mandatory 5-year sentence for his first §924(c) count of conviction and, despite being first-time offenders, each received 25-year mandatory sentences on every §924(c) count beyond his first. Thus, each petitioner’s sentence exceeded 325 years. Petitioners successfully challenged some of their convictions on direct appeal, and the Fifth Circuit vacated petitioners’ sentences. In 2012, the District Court resentenced each petitioner to between 285 and 305 years on the counts that remained.
In 2019, the Court held that the “crime of violence” definition the Government routinely used to support some §924(c) convictions was unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445,470. Because that holding potentially affected some of petitioners’ remaining convictions, the Fifth Circuit granted petitioners authorization to file a second or successive postconviction motion. The District Court then vacated the impacted §924(c) convictions, as well as petitioners’ sentences. When the District Court held resentencings for the remaining convictions, petitioners argued that the First Step Act’s 5-year—not 25-year—mandatory minimum penalties applied. Petitioners argued they were entitled to retroactive application of the Act’s more lenient penalties because a vacated prior sentence is not a sentence that “has . . . been imposed” for purposes of §403(b). The District Court disagreed and resentenced petitioners under the pre-Act sentencing scheme, giving them stacked 25-year mandatory minimums for each §924(c) count of conviction beyond their first. Petitioners thus each received sentences of 130 years or more.
On appeal, petitioners and the Government agreed that the First Step Act should have applied at petitioners’ resentencings. The Fifth Circuit denied their joint request for vacatur. In that court’s view, §403(b) applies only “to defendants for whom ‘a sentence . . . ha[d] not been imposed’ as of the enactment date.” 92 F. 4th 304, 310. Because each petitioner had been sentenced (twice) prior to the Act’s enactment, the panel concluded that petitioners were not eligible for the First Step Act’s more lenient mandatory minimums.
Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Under §403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence “has . . . been imposed” for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act’s more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous §924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act’s enactment.
Skinny: Once again with the second chances. Because the defendants' previous sentences were thrown out (due to the vagueness of the statute under which they were convicted), they get the benefit of the First Step Act sentencing provisions this time around.
You can check out prior installments of The Skinny on SCOTUS series here.
