Moving right along through the Supreme Court's 2025 term, we've now hit the late-May cases, which include a couple of unanimous decisions, one final decree, and then some interesting splits (5-4, 8-1, 6-3).
Our topics include boundaries (for courts, waterways, and states), interstate commerce, race-neutral jury selection, and compassionate release.
We've got 40 down and 28 more to go (with less than three weeks until the start of the 2026 term), so let's get to it:
Margolin v. National Association of Immigration Judges
Date: May 26, 2026
Author: Per Curiam
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 4th Circuit
Basic Facts:
In October 2021, the Executive Office for Immigration Review implemented a rule requiring immigration judges to obtain supervisory approval for public speeches relating to their official duties. An association of such judges (respondent here) challenged the policy in federal district court, asserting violations of its members' First and Fifth Amendment rights. The District Court held that respondent's challenge must proceed through the administrative review scheme established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 92 Stat. 1122, 1125, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1205, 1206. But the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for factfinding into whether that review scheme was functioning as Congress intended, an issue the parties had not raised.
Issue:
Did the Fourth Circuit violate the party-presentation principle by deciding the case on a broader issue that neither party had raised or had an opportunity to address?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
The Fourth Circuit violated the party-presentation principle when it decided a question much broader than the one respondent advanced.
Skinny: Quit freelancing, 4th Circuit — you're a court, not a roving commission.
Date: May 26, 2026
Author: N/A — Final Decree
Split: N/A
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction
Basic Facts:
Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado have agreed to resolve their dispute over the Rio Grande Compact, with the decree establishing how Rio Grande water below Elephant Butte Reservoir will be divided between Texas and New Mexico. At the center is the Effective El Paso Index, which annually calculates how much water Texas is entitled to receive and compares that obligation with what Texas actually gets. New Mexico gets the balance, provided it complies with the decree.
Issue:
How will Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado finally resolve and administer their dispute over the allocation of Rio Grande water under the Rio Grande Compact?
Holding: Approved.
The proposed final decree, Appendix A to the Fourth Interim Report of the Special Master, entitled “Consent Decree Supporting the Rio Grande Compact (with Appendices 1 and 2)” is entered. The Honorable D. Brooks Smith, of Duncansville, Pennsylvania, the Special Master in this case, is hereby discharged with the thanks of the Court. (This one doesn't have a traditional "holding." This is essentially SCOTUS putting its judicial seal on the states' deal and handing them a very detailed rulebook for sharing the Rio Grande going forward.)
Skinny: Water under the bridge? Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado finally have a deal for divvying up the Rio Grande, and SCOTUS approves this message.
Date: May 28, 2026
Author: Neil Gorsuch
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 10th Circuit
Basic Facts:
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires courts to enforce many private arbitration agreements, but it also provides that “nothing” in the law shall be used to compel arbitration in disputes involving the “contracts of employment” of any class of workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce.” 9 U. S. C. § 1. This case poses the question whether someone can qualify as a worker under the § 1 exemption if he never crosses state lines and never interacts with vehicles that do. Flowers Foods, Inc., is a large producer of packaged baked goods with bakeries in 19 States. To get its products to market, the company depends in part on franchisees who buy the distribution rights to Flowers’s products in specific geographic territories. Angelo Brock is one such franchisee serving the Denver area; he picks up Flowers’s products from a warehouse in Colorado and delivers them to local stores, all without leaving the State. In 2022, Brock sued Flowers in federal district court alleging that the company had underpaid him and other distributors in violation of various federal and state laws. Flowers moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the FAA generally requires courts to stay or dismiss cases when the parties have agreed to resolve their disputes by arbitration and that Brock had signed a distribution agreement promising to arbitrate any disagreement. The district court denied Flowers’s motion, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Resting its decision on 9 U. S. C. § 1, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Brock belonged to a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce and thus the court lacked authority to compel arbitration.
Issue:
Can a worker qualify for the FAA's exemption for transportation workers “engaged in interstate commerce” when he never crosses a state line and never interacts with a vehicle that does?
Holding: Affirmed.
A worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can qualify for § 1’s exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do.
Skinny: You don't have to cross the finish line to be part of the interstate commerce relay.
Date: May 28, 2026
Author: Brett Kavanaugh
Split: 5-4
Dissent: Gorsuch, Alito, Barrett, Thomas
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
Basic Facts:
In 2004, two black teenagers, Terry Pitchford and Eric Bullins, robbed a grocery store near Grenada, Mississippi. During the robbery, Bullins shot and killed the white store owner. Bullins reached a plea agreement and received a 20-year sentence for the homicide. The State charged Pitchford with capital murder and sought the death penalty. During jury selection at Pitchford’s trial, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against four of the five black potential jurors. As this Court held in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, the Equal Protection Clause bars prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based on race. In Batson and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out a three-step process for a trial court to determine whether a prosecutor employed a peremptory challenge based on race. Here, Pitchford’s counsel raised an objection under Batson and made a prima facie showing that the strikes of the four black jurors were based on race (step one). The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral reasons for each strike, and the prosecutor offered reasons (step two). The trial court declared the prosecutor’s stated reasons to be race neutral, but the trial court did not afford defense counsel an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons as pretextual (step three); nor did it make any findings regarding whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were pretextual. At the close of jury selection, defense counsel sought to raise the Batson issue again, but the trial court twice cut off defense counsel. The empaneled jury, consisting of 11 white jurors and 1 black juror, convicted Pitchford of capital murder and sentenced him to death.
On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Pitchford had waived his Batson objection by not arguing to the trial court that the prosecutor’s proffered explanations were pretextual. Pitchford later filed a habeas corpus petition in U. S. District Court. Applying the applicable standard to obtain federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the District Court concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Batson and had unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his Batson objection. The District Court explained that no state court had conducted the full three-step Batson inquiry, and that the trial court had “thwarted” the “attempt by Pitchford’s counsel to argue pretext.” 706 F. Supp. 3d 614, 624. The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, concluding that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s waiver finding was reasonable.
Issue:
Did Mississippi reasonably conclude that Pitchford waived the third step of his Batson challenge when the trial judge never gave his lawyer a sufficient opportunity to argue that the prosecutor's supposedly race-neutral reasons were actually pretextual?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
The Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.
Skinny: You can't skip Step 3, shut down the lawyer who tries to raise it, then blame him for skipping Step 3.
Date: May 28, 2026
Author: Amy Coney Barrett
Split: 8-1 (though Kagan and Sotomayor split on the reasoning, they concurred in the judgment)
Dissent: Jackson
Appeal From: 2nd Circuit
Basic Facts:
Joe Fernandez was indicted in 2013 for his role in the assassination of two gang members. The prosecution's theory was that members of a drug ring had paid Fernandez to act as the backup shooter, and when the primary shooter's gun jammed, Fernandez fired 14 rounds and killed both victims. Fernandez's alleged co-conspirator, Patrick Darge, testified against Fernandez at trial. The jury convicted Fernandez of murder for hire and a firearms offense, and the District Court imposed two consecutive life sentences.
Fernandez pursued multiple avenues of relief. He first asked the District Court to reconsider, alleging Brady violations related to the Government's failure to disclose that another alleged co-conspirator, Luis Rivera, had denied driving the getaway car. The District Court reviewed the Government's notes from interviewing Rivera and concluded that they did not contain relevant information, though the judge noted he was “troubled” by the Government's lenient treatment of Rivera. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting both the Brady claim and Fernandez's insufficiency-of-evidence argument. It held that a reasonable jury could credit Darge's testimony and that the evidence was sufficient to support conviction. Fernandez then twice moved for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. The first motion, arguing actual innocence based on witness credibility, was described by the Second Circuit as “plainly meritless.” The second succeeded only in vacating his firearms conviction based on United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, thus leaving in place Fernandez's murder-for-hire conviction. In the order vacating the firearms conviction, the District Judge speculated that the Government had offered Rivera a lenient plea deal because it “kn[ew] something” inconsistent with Darge's testimony, and pointedly noted that if Fernandez's life sentence on the murder-for-hire charge “were to be commuted, or held unlawful, [Fernandez] would be released immediately.” 569 F. Supp. 3d 169, 174, n. 4, 179.
Fernandez finally filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that extraordinary and compelling reasons—above all, that he was innocent—warranted a sentencing reduction. The District Court granted the motion, citing unease about whether Darge's testimony had been truthful, concerns about the Government's charging decisions, and doubts about the correctness of the jury's verdict. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that challenges to the validity of a conviction are not cognizable as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Seven circuits agree with the Second Circuit on that legal issue, while two circuits take the other side.
Issue:
Can a federal prisoner use the compassionate-release statute, § 3582, to obtain a reduced sentence based on arguments that attack the validity of his conviction, rather than pursuing those arguments through the federal postconviction statute, § 2255?
Holding: Affirmed.
A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. § 2255, not 18 U. S. C. § 3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.
Skinny: Compassionate release is for mercy, not a Mulligan on your conviction.
Date: May 28, 2026
Author: Amy Coney Barrett
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson
Appeal From: 3rd Circuit
Basic Facts:
Petitioner Daniel Rutherford was convicted of two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). Petitioner Johnnie Carter was convicted of three § 924(c) violations. At the time each was sentenced, a defendant convicted of two § 924(c) counts was subject to a mandatory 25-year sentence for the second offense that would be “stacked” upon (i. e., run consecutively to) the first offense's mandatory penalty. That sentencing scheme resulted in a 32-year minimum sentence for Rutherford's § 924(c) violations and a 57-year minimum sentence for Carter's violations. Years later, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, which eliminated the 25-year stacking requirement for first-time offenders. Rutherford and Carter do not qualify for the Act's reduced penalties because the amendment to § 924(c) does not apply to defendants sentenced before the Act. In separate proceedings below, however, Rutherford and Carter each invoked the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) as a basis for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (commonly referred to as the “compassionate release” provision) allows a court to reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment if the court finds, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The courts below held that the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduced sentence. The Third Circuit explained in Rutherford's case that the Commission's 2023 amended policy statement—which adds “Unusually Long Sentence” to the list of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that might warrant compassionate release under certain circumstances, see USSG App. C, Amdt. 814—“conflicts with the will of Congress” expressed in the statute and thus “cannot be considered in determining a prisoner's eligibility for compassionate release.” 120 F. 4th 360, 376. The Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to resolve the split of Circuit authority over whether the disparity created by a nonretroactive change to sentencing law is an “extraordinary and compelling reaso[n]” that warrants compassionate release.
Issue:
Can the sentencing disparity created by a nonretroactive change in federal sentencing law qualify as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)?
Holding: Affirmed.
When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to § 924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Skinny: Compassionate release is not a time machine for sentencing changes Congress made nonretroactive.
