March was a busy month at the Supreme Court, and we're already more than a third of the way through April, with a new round of oral arguments set to begin on April 20, and, one suspects, more decisions being handed down by the High Court before the month is through.
So, to catch us up on the March decisions, I offer up Part 1 of the March Skinny, which includes three unanimous decisions (on sovereign immunity, immigration court deference, and the First Amendment), but kicks off with a somewhat wonky one involving parental rights.
March 2026 Decisions — Part One
Date: March 2, 2026
Author: Per Curiam
Split: 5-4ish*
Dissent: Kagan, Jackson
Appeal From: 9th Circuit
Basic Facts (summarized):
The case arose from a challenge to California public school policies governing how schools handle a student’s gender identity and social transition at school. Two teachers, later joined by parents of California students, sued state and local education officials, alleging that school personnel were instructed not to disclose a student’s use of a different name, pronouns, or gender presentation to parents without the student’s consent.
The parent plaintiffs alleged that these policies directly affected their families. In one instance, parents were not informed that their daughter had been presenting as a boy at school until after a suicide attempt led to hospitalization, at which point they learned from medical providers that she had been experiencing gender dysphoria. In another case, parents confronted school administrators after suspecting their daughter was socially transitioning at school without their knowledge and were told state law barred disclosure absent the child’s consent.
After discovery, the district court certified parent and teacher classes, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and entered a statewide injunction requiring schools to inform parents about a child’s social transition and to follow parental directives regarding names and pronouns. The Ninth Circuit stayed that injunction pending appeal, citing concerns about the breadth of the class certification and the merits of the constitutional claims, prompting the emergency application to the Supreme Court.
Whether the Supreme Court should vacate a stay from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit that paused a ruling that would have required educators to notify parents if their child changes the name or pronouns they're using in school.
Holding: Application to vacate stay granted in part (as to parents).
We conclude that the parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim. California’s policies likely trigger strict scrutiny under that provision because they substantially interfere with the “right of parents to guide the religious development of their children.” Mahmoud, 606 U. S., at 559 (citing Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972)). The parents who assert a free exercise claim have sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender, and they feel a religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs. California’s policies violate those beliefs and “impos[e] the kind of burden on religious exercise that Yoder found unacceptable.” 606 U. S., at 550. Indeed, the intrusion on parents’ free exercise rights here—unconsented facilitation of a child’s gender transition—is greater than the introduction of LGBTQ storybooks we considered sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny in Mahmoud. See id., at 563.
...
The same is true for the subclass of parents who object to those policies on due process grounds. Under long-established precedent, parents—not the State—have primary authority with respect to “the upbringing and education of children.” Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535 (1925); accord, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399–400 (1923). The right protected by these precedents includes the right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health. Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979). Gender dysphoria is a condition that has an important bearing on a child’s mental health, but when a child exhibits symptoms of gender dysphoria at school, California’s policies conceal that information from parents and facilitate a degree of gender transitioning during school hours. These policies likely violate parents’ rights to direct the upbringing and education of their children.
Skinny: Parental rights win for now; teachers' (conscientious objection) rights remain on hold.
*Added Note: This one's a bit of an odd duck. It's a case from the Interim/Emergency Docket, rather than the standard Oral Argument crop of cases; it's per curiam, so it doesn't necessarily lend itself to the standard "Skinny" treatment; and the split among the justices is a bit of a pretzel knot. This was effectively a 5-4 ruling for limited relief (i.e., the partial stay), with Justices Thomas and Alito arguing for broader relief that would also cover teachers, while Justices Kagan and Jackson dissented in full, and Justice Sotomayor would have denied the application outright.
Gallette v. New Jersey Transit Corp.
Date: March 4, 2026
Author: Sotomayor
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
In 1979, the New Jersey Legislature created the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit) as a “body corporate and politic with corporate succession” and constituted it as an “instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental functions” but “independent of any supervision or control” by the New Jersey Department of Transportation. N. J. Stat. §27:25–4(a). The State gave NJ Transit significant authority, including the power to make bylaws, sue and be sued, make contracts, acquire property, raise funds, own corporate entities, adopt regulations, and exercise eminent domain powers. §§27:25–5, 27:25–13. NJ Transit’s organic statute provides that “[n]odebt or liability of the corporation shall . . . constitute a debt [or] liability of the State,” and that “[a]ll expenses . . . shall be payable from funds available to the corporation.” §27:25–17. NJ Transit is governed by a board of directors (Board). §27:25–4(b). The Governor may remove Board members and may veto Board actions; the Legislature may veto some eminent domain actions. §§27:25–4(b), (f); §27:25–13(h). NJ Transit is now the third largest provider of bus, rail, and light rail transit, operating within an area that includes New Jersey, New York City, and Philadelphia.
In 2017, Jeffrey Colt was struck by an NJ Transit bus in Midtown Manhattan; a year later, Cedric Galette was injured when an NJ Transit bus crashed into a car in which he was a passenger in Philadelphia. Both sued NJ Transit for negligence in their respective home state courts. NJ Transit moved to dismiss both lawsuits, arguing that it is an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity. The New York Court of Appeals held that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the opposite, concluding NJ Transit is an arm of New Jersey. This Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is entitled to interstate sovereign immunity under the Federal Constitution, as held by the highest court of Pennsylvania in square conflict with the highest court of New York.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.
Skinny: The state may have made you (NJ Transit Corp.), but that won't keep you out of court.
Date: March 4, 2026
Author: Jackson
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 1st Circuit
Petitioners Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia, and their minor child G. E. U. G., are natives of El Salvador who entered the United States without authorization in 2021. After being placed in removal proceedings, petitioners applied for asylum. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the U. S. Government ‘may grant asylum’ to a noncitizen if it ‘determines’ that he ‘is a refugee.’ §1158(b)(1)(A). An asylum seeker qualifies as a ‘refugee’ if he ‘is unable or unwilling to return’ to his country of nationality ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’ §1101(a)(42)(A).
In support of petitioners’ applications for asylum, Urias-Orellana testified that he was being targeted by a hitman in El Salvador. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Urias-Orellana’s testimony credible but concluded that it did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution under the INA. The IJ accordingly denied the petitioners’ asylum applications and ordered their removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On petition for review, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also affirmed, holding that, under the substantial-evidence standard of review, the record did not compel a contrary finding.
Issue:
Whether courts of appeals must apply substantial-evidence review to the BIA’s determination that undisputed facts do not amount to “persecution” under the asylum provisions of the INA.
Holding: Affirmed.
The INA requires application of the substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s determination whether a given set of undisputed facts rises to the level of persecution under §1101(a)(42)(A).
Skinny: Hey, Article III courts: Stay in your lane.
Added Note: Look, even Justice Jackson went along with this. Hopefully, the federal courts will get the memo.
Date: March 20, 2026
Author: Kagan
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
Petitioner Gabriel Olivier is a street preacher in Mississippi who believes that sharing his religious views with fellow citizens is an important part of exercising his faith. His vocation sometimes took him to the sidewalks near an amphitheater in the City of Brandon, where he could find sizable audiences attending events. In 2019, the City adopted an ordinance requiring all individuals or groups engaging in ‘protests’ or ‘demonstrations,’ at around the time events were scheduled, to stay within a ‘designated protest area.’ In 2021, Olivier was arrested for violating that ordinance. He pleaded no contest in municipal court. The court imposed a $304 fine, one year of probation, and 10 days of imprisonment to be served only if he violated the ordinance during his probation. Olivier did not appeal, paid the fine, and served no prison time. Because he still wanted to preach near the amphitheater, Olivier filed suit against the City in federal court under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that the city ordinance violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by consigning him and other speakers to the amphitheater’s protest area. The complaint seeks, as a remedy, a declaration that the ordinance infringes the First Amendment and an injunction preventing city officials from enforcing the ordinance in the future. In other words, the relief requested is only prospective; Olivier seeks neither the reversal of, nor compensation for, his prior conviction.
Issue:
Whether Heck v. Humphrey bars a §1983 suit seeking only prospective injunctive relief against future enforcement of an ordinance when the plaintiff was previously convicted under that same ordinance.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Olivier’s suit seeking purely prospective relief—an injunction stopping officials from enforcing an ordinance in the future—can proceed, notwithstanding Olivier’s prior conviction for violating that ordinance; Heck does not hold otherwise.
Skinny: Past conviction, future challenge: Heck doesn’t slam the courthouse door.
Added Note: Expect to see this one cited frequently in future First Amendment and civil-rights litigation involving protest zones, permitting schemes, and local restrictions on expressive conduct.
You can check out prior installments of The Skinny on SCOTUS series here.
