There's still a long way to go in the Supreme Court's 2025 term — there's a new batch of oral arguments set for late February, and another in late March (including the birthright citizenship case). But the Court had a busy January, issuing eight decisions, covering a variety of topics (though, of course, not the Voting Rights Act or tariffs — yet).
We'll tackle the first four of January in this installment. Three involved criminal procedure (and two of those involve the same statute), while one involves standing and electoral challenges. Two were unanimous, one was decided 7-2, and one was 5-4.
January 9, 2026 Decision
Date: January 9, 2026
Author: Sotomayor
Split: 5-4
Dissent: Gorsuch, Thomas, Alito, Barrett (in part)
Appeal From: 11th Circuit
Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is serving a 24-year sentence in federal custody after pleading guilty in 2008 to three offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; (2) attempted Hobbs Act robbery; and (3) using a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence” as defined in18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A). Bowe’s §924(c) conviction carried a mandatory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively to his sentence for the robbery offenses. To have been properly convicted under §924(c), at least one of Bowe’s other offenses must qualify as a “crime of violence” under one of two definitional clauses in §924(c): the “elements clause,” §924(c)(3)(A), or the “residual clause,” §924(c)(3)(B). But decisions issued years after Bowe’s conviction call into question whether either clause can support his §924(c) conviction. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 470 (residual clause void for vagueness); United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845, 860 (attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the elements clause).
This case concerns Bowe’s efforts to obtain postconviction relief from the mandatory consecutive 10-year sentence imposed under §924(c). A comprehensive statutory scheme governs when and how state and federal prisoners can seek postconviction relief in federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §2254 (state prisoners); §2255 (federal prisoners). Particularly relevant here, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or subsequent efforts at obtaining postconviction relief require the prisoner first to seek certification from a court of appeals that the filing meets threshold conditions before a prisoner can proceed in a district court. See §2244 (authorization requests by state prisoners); §2255(h) (successive-motion requests by federal prisoners). While §§2244 and 2255(h) have distinct requirements, §2255(h) cross-references some of the procedures in §2244 for how a “panel of the appropriate court of appeals” “certifie[s]” a second or successive filing.
Bowe first sought §2255 relief in 2016, arguing that §924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that—regardless of the residual clause’s constitutionality—Bowe’s §924(c) conviction was proper because attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. In 2019, after Davis, Bowe sought permission from the Eleventh Circuit under §2255(h) to file a second or successive motion. A three-judge panel found that Bowe had not met §2255(h)’s threshold conditions. Although the panel acknowledged that Davis announced a new, retroactive constitutional rule (one of the two statutory gateways for successive motions under §2255(h)(2)), it held that Bowe could not make a prima facie showing that his §924(c) conviction was unconstitutional because then-binding Circuit precedent still treated attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. After Taylor was decided in 2022, Bowe once again sought authorization under §2255(h), arguing that Davis and Taylor leave none of his convictions as a valid predicate “crime of violence” under §924(c). A panel dismissed the part of Bowe’s request resting on Davis, reasoning that the claim had been “presented in a prior application” and that the panel lacked jurisdiction over such old claims under §2244(b)(1). The panel also denied the part of Bowe’s request that rested on Taylor, concluding that Taylor did not announce a new constitutional rule within the meaning of §2255(h)(2). Bowe returned to the Eleventh Circuit several times, seeking authorization to pursue postconviction relief, initial hearing en banc, and reversal of Circuit precedent applying §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 motions. He also requested certification of the question whether §2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners. See §1254(2). Bowe’s requests were denied. Bowe eventually filed this petition for certiorari, pointing out a circuit split: Six Circuits apply §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar to federal prisoners, while three do not. The Court granted review.
- Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
- Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
- The Court has jurisdiction because §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive §2255 motion.
- Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions filed under §2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences.
Skinny: Federal prisoners have additional options for postconviction relief that state prisoners do not (and if Congress wants them to be limited to the same options, it needs to better spell that out in the statutes in question).
January 14, 2026 Decisions
Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections
Date: January 14, 2026
Author: Roberts
Split: 7-2
Dissent: Jackson, Sotomayor
Appeal From: 7th Circuit
Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in ballots postmarked or certified no later than election day and received within two weeks of election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candidates filed a lawsuit claiming that counting ballots received after election day violates federal law. They principally contended that doing so conflicts with 2 U. S. C. §7 and 3 U. S. C. §1, which set election day as the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. The district court dismissed the case, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that petitioners lacked standing.
Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election.
Skinny: Candidates get to sue over rules governing vote counting.
Date: January 14, 2026
Author: Kagan
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: Montana Supreme Court
In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 400, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that someone inside needs emergency assistance. In this case, Montana police officers responded to the home of petitioner William Case after his ex-girlfriend called 9–1–1 to report that he was threatening suicide and may have shot himself. The officers knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window, but got no response. They could see an empty handgun holster and something that looked like a suicide note inside, and they ultimately decided to enter the home to render emergency aid. When one officer approached a bedroom closet in which Case was hiding, Case threw open the closet curtain while holding an object that looked like a gun. Fearing that he was about to be shot, the officer shot and injured Case. An ambulance was called to take Case to the hospital, and officers found a handgun next to where Case had stood.
Case was charged with assaulting a police officer. Case moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the home entry, arguing that the police violated the Fourth Amendment by entering without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury found Case guilty. A divided Montana Supreme Court upheld the officers’ entry as lawful under Montana’s caretaker doctrine, rejecting the contention that an officer must have probable cause to believe that an occupant needs emergency aid.
Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.
Holding: Affirmed.
Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case.
Skinny: The cops don't need probable cause to enter without a warrant if there's an "objectively reasonable" belief that someone inside needs emergency aid.
Date: January 14, 2026
Author: Jackson
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 2nd Circuit
This case concerns the relationship between two provisions of 18 U. S. C. §924: subsection (c)(1)(A)(i), which criminalizes using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, and subsection (j), which prescribes different penalties—including, in certain circumstances, capital punishment—when “a violation of subsection (c)” causes death. The question presented is whether a single act that violates both provisions may yield two convictions—one under each provision—or only one.
The Second Circuit held that one such act may yield two convictions. The Second Circuit acknowledged that subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) qualify as the same offense under the test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299. But it believed that, as construed in Lora v. United States, 599 U. S. 453, the two provisions are separate offenses for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative punishments. Because the Second Circuit’s decision deepened a split among the Courts of Appeals, this Court granted certiorari.
- Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.
- Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney, 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).
Holding: Reversed in part and remanded.
Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. One act that violates both provisions therefore may spawn only one conviction. The part of the Second Circuit’s judgment that held otherwise is reversed.
Skinny: One criminal act = one conviction. (And if Congress intended otherwise, it needs to clearly say so in the statutory language.)
You can check out prior installments of The Skinny on SCOTUS series here.
