Skinny on SCOTUS: Green Cards, Government Strings, and ‘See You in Court, Commies!’

Now, I realize the Court isn't going to start issuing decisions next week (aside from potential emergency docket rulings). Still, it only seems appropriate to start the new term with a fresh slate. Plus, several readers have asked for updated "scorecard" entries to review how the administration is faring overall in the courts now that we're winding down the second year of Trump 2.0. So...I've got my work cut out for me. 

The Court dished out 28 decisions in June, and we've covered 11. Next up, we've got six from mid-late June that include five 6-3 splits (guess who the three dissenters are!?) and one unanimous decision. Our topics include confessions, green card holders, tax foreclosures, prisoners’ religious rights, Cuba’s confiscation of American property, and human rights lawsuits. (No orangutans this time, though.)

McCarthy v. Hernandez

Date: June 22, 2026

Author: Per curiam

Split: 6-3

Dissent: Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson

Appeal From: 2nd Circuit  

Basic Facts:

In 2017, a New York jury found Pedro Hernandez guilty of kidnapping and murdering 6-year-old Etan Patz decades earlier. At issue during the trial, on direct appeal, and on habeas review were the trial court’s jury instructions concerning various confessions to the crime by Hernandez. When detectives first questioned Hernandez about the crime at the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office (CCPO), they did so without first administering a Miranda warning, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and Hernandez, a man with a low IQ and a history of mental illness, eventually confessed to strangling Patz and dumping his body. The detectives then read Hernandez his Miranda rights, and he waived those rights and made a second, videotaped confession. Hernandez later gave another videotaped confession to an assistant district attorney in New York, and he continued to confess to Patz’s murder to his family, his psychiatrist, and others. At trial, the trial court denied Hernandez’s motion to suppress his statements to the detectives and the assistant district attorney. The court ruled that Hernandez was not in custody at the CCPO before he received his Miranda warning and that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before he made his later videotaped confessions. Under New York law, however, the trial court’s decision not to suppress those confessions did not prevent the defense from asking the jury to disregard them. During jury deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note asking whether, if the jury found that the initial confession at CCPO before the Miranda rights was not voluntary, the jury must disregard the two later videotaped confessions and the confessions to others. The trial judge advised the jury that the answer to its question was “no.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 307a. In an exchange with counsel outside the presence of the jury, the trial court explained that although New York law requires a jury to disregard confessions that it finds were “involuntarily made,” state law does not empower a jury to assess whether a later confession is fatally tainted by an earlier, “involuntary” confession. So the trial court did not think it proper to “instruc[t]” the jury “on attenuation” when it was “not their function” to consider that issue. Id., at 301a–302a. New York’s intermediate appellate court (the Appellate Division, First Department) affirmed. The appellate court ruled that the trial judge had responded to the jury note in accord with state law. People v. Hernandez, 181 App. Div. 3d 530, 532–533, 122 N. Y. S. 3d 11, 14–15. And it concluded that the verdict would have been the same even if the trial judge had instructed the jury on attenuation. The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, and this Court denied certiorari.

Hernandez next filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes strict limits on federal courts’ power to grant habeas relief to a prisoner convicted in state court. As relevant here, a federal court may grant habeas relief on a claim that a state court has resolved on the merits only if that decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). Hernandez argued that the Appellate Division had violated clearly established federal law in rejecting his Miranda arguments and in its ruling on the trial court’s response to the jury note. That response, Hernandez maintained, itself violated clearly established federal law by failing to explain to the jury the rule that Justice Kennedy adopted in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U. S. 600. Seibert addressed the constitutionality of an interrogation tactic under which police question a suspect in custody without providing a Miranda warning and then, after eliciting a confession, provide a Miranda warning and ask the suspect to repeat the confession. The Court ruled that the use of this tactic in that case violated federal law. The District Court denied Hernandez’s habeas application, but a panel of the Second Circuit reversed, Hernandez v. McIntosh, 146 F. 4th 142, finding the trial court’s answer to the jury’s question to be “manifestly inaccurate.” Id., at 159. In the panel’s view, that error warranted habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1) because the response was contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of Seibert. 146 F. 4th, at 159–160.

Issue: 

Could the 2nd Circuit grant federal habeas relief because the trial judge did not instruct the jury on whether Hernandez’s initial confession tainted his later confessions?

Holding: Reversed and remanded. 

The Second Circuit exceeded its authority in holding that Hernandez is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1); no clearly established federal law required the trial court to instruct the jury about the rule that Justice Kennedy adopted in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U. S. 600, and the Second Circuit erred in holding otherwise. The Appellate Division’s decision neither contravened nor unreasonably applied any holding of this Court.

Skinny: You can’t fault a state court for breaking a rule the Supreme Court never made.

Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau

Date: June 23, 2026

Author: Thomas

Split: 6-3

Dissent: Jackson, Sotomayor, Kagan

Appeal From: 2nd Circuit  

Basic Facts:

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Government can remove aliens applying for admission to the country if they are “ ‘inadmissible,’ ” and it can remove aliens already admitted if they are “ ‘deportable.’ ” Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 602 U. S. 447, 451. In this case, respondent Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. On May 7, 2012, New Jersey charged Lau with trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, Lau temporarily left the United States for China. On June 15, 2012, Lau attempted to reenter the United States by presenting himself to a border officer at the airport. Lawful permanent residents generally must be regarded as already admitted to the country and usually do not have to reapply for admission when they return from temporary overseas travel. 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). Under an exception, the Government may regard a lawful permanent resident as “seeking an admission” (and thus as not already admitted) if he “has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2),” § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), including a crime involving moral turpitude, § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Because of Lau’s pending criminal charge, the border officer did not regard Lau as already admitted, but instead paroled him pending the resolution of his criminal case, meaning that Lau was allowed to physically enter the country without being formally admitted. After Lau pleaded guilty to his trademark-counterfeiting charge on June 24, 2013, the Government initiated removal proceedings against him. At those proceedings, the Government charged Lau as an applicant for admission who was inadmissible for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Lau argued that he was a lawful permanent resident already admitted and subject to removal only on deportability grounds. Muk Choi Lau v. Bondi, 130 F. 4th 42, 44. The Immigration Judge found Lau removable as charged, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Lau sought review in the Second Circuit, which vacated the removal order. It concluded that Lau should have been regarded as already admitted upon arrival unless the border officer had “clear and convincing” evidence that Lau had committed the crime, which it held that the officer lacked. Id., at 46. Without that evidence, the court concluded, border officers must regard lawful permanent residents as already admitted, which precludes removal on inadmissibility grounds. The court remanded to the agency without prejudice to the Government’s ability to charge Lau with deportability. Because the Second Circuit’s decision conflicted with those of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Court granted certiorari.

Issue: 

Must a border officer have clear and convincing evidence that a returning lawful permanent resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating that resident as an applicant for admission?

Holding: Vacated and remanded.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not require a border officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission. 

Skinny: A green card isn't a free pass back in — and border officers don’t have to hold a mini-trial at the airport.

Pung v. Isabella County

Date: June 23, 2026

Author: Alito

Split: 9-0

Dissent: N/A

Appeal From: 6th Circuit  

Basic Facts:

The Pung family owed $2,241.93 in real-property taxes, so local tax authorities in Isabella County, Michigan, initiated foreclosure proceedings and sold the Pung home—which was assessed at $194,400 for tax purposes—for $76,008 at public auction. Michael Pung sued in Federal court, and the District Court granted Pung partial summary judgment on his Fifth Amendment claim. The court held that Pung should receive only the surplus proceeds from the tax sale—i. e., the difference between the sale price and the tax debt—not the property’s fair market value. The District Court also rejected Pung’s claim under the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: 

After selling a home to collect unpaid property taxes, must the government compensate the owner based on the home’s fair market value rather than its auction price under the Fifth or Eighth Amendment?

Holding: Vacated and remanded.

1. The proper baseline for measuring “just compensation” following a tax sale is the auction sale price, not the property’s hypothetical fair market value, at least when the sale is fairly conducted in light of the country’s history of tax sales. 

2. The Court rejects Pung’s argument that the County violated the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause by failing to compensate him for his property’s fair market value. Forfeiture of property can be a “fin[e]” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment if it serves “in part to punish.” Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 610. Pung lacks precedent or historical evidence suggesting that a tax sale which is fairly conducted in light of our Nation’s history would violate the Eighth Amendment. In addition, imposing Pung’s fair-market-value rule under the Eighth Amendment would entail the same drastic consequences as imposing the rule under the Fifth Amendment. 

Skinny: The government owes you the leftover proceeds from a fair tax sale, not a better sale price. 

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety

Date: June 23, 2026

Author: Gorsuch

Split: 6-3

Dissent: Jackson, Sotomayor, Kagan

Appeal From: 5th Circuit  

Basic Facts:

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause authority and imposes various conditions on federal funds distributed to state prison systems like the Louisiana Department of Corrections (LDOC). One condition requires state prison systems to agree to answer federal suits by private plaintiffs alleging certain substantial burdens on their religious exercises. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000cc–1(a), (b)(1). Relying on that provision, inmate Damon Landor brought this RLUIPA lawsuit against LDOC as well as some of the prison system’s individual officers in their personal capacities, seeking damages from them. Mr. Landor is a Rastafarian whose religious convictions require him to leave his hair uncut. He claims that LDOC officers—despite being aware of his religious beliefs—forcibly shaved his head. The officers moved to dismiss, arguing that while their employer LDOC may have agreed to answer certain private suits under RLUIPA, they were not parties to any such agreement, and therefore Mr. Landor had no federal cause of action against them. The district court dismissed Mr. Landor’s RLUIPA claims against both the officers and LDOC. On appeal, Mr. Landor challenged only the dismissal of his claim against the individual officers. The Fifth Circuit declined to revive that portion of his suit, holding that RLUIPA does not permit suits against officers in their individual capacities.

Issue: 

Can Landor recover damages from prison officers personally under RLUIPA when their employer accepted federal funding but the officers never agreed to face liability under the law?

Holding: Affirmed.

Individuals may not be held liable in their personal capacities under a Spending Clause statute unless those individuals have voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer lawsuits under the statute; because the individual defendants in this case did not voluntarily and knowingly consent to face RLUIPA liability in an agreement with the federal government, Mr. Landor’s case cannot proceed against them.

Skinny: Federal dollars have strings attached for prisons, but that doesn't put individual officers’ wallets on the hook.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación CIMEX, S. A. (Cuba)

Date: June 23, 2026

Author: Brett Kavanaugh

Split: 6-3

Dissent: Kagan, Sotomayor, Jackson

Appeal From: D.C. Circuit  

Basic Facts:

In 1960, after Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, the Cuban Government confiscated many foreign-owned assets, including Exxon’s oil refinery, terminals, packaging plants, and more than a hundred service stations. Since then, two Cuban government-owned companies—Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET) and Corporación CIMEX, S. A. (Cuba) (CIMEX)—have operated and profited from Exxon’s expropriated assets. Exxon had no good way to sue the Cuban government entities and seek compensation for its confiscated property until Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act in 1996. As relevant here, the Act created a private right of action for U. S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban Government against “any person that . . . traffics in” the confiscated property, 22 U. S. C. §6082(a)(1)(A), with “person” defined to include “any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” §6023(11). Exxon sued CUPET, CIMEX, and later CIMEX’s Panamanian alter ego under the Helms-Burton Act in the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking more than $1 billion in damages. The Cuban government-owned companies moved to dismiss, asserting immunity under the generally applicable Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Exxon countered that the Helms-Burton Act itself waived the defendants’ sovereign immunity. The District Court sided with the Cuban government defendants, and a divided panel of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit affirmed. 111 F. 4th 12, 23.

Issue: 

Does the Helms-Burton Act itself allow suits against Cuban government agencies and instrumentalities, or must plaintiffs also establish an exception to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

Holding: Reversed and remanded.

The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue Cuban agencies or instrumentalities under the Act need not also satisfy one of FSIA’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

Skinny: See you in court, Commies!

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe

Date: June 23, 2026

Author: Barrett

Split: 6-3

Dissent: Jackson, Kagan, Sotomayor

Appeal From: 9th Circuit  

Basic Facts:

Plaintiffs contend that the Chinese Government persecuted them because of their religious beliefs, and that Cisco Systems, Inc. enabled that persecution by developing surveillance technology that allowed China to identify and apprehend them. Plaintiffs allege that Cisco and its executives are liable for aiding and abetting violations of international law, citing the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). One plaintiff also seeks to hold two Cisco executives liable for aiding and abetting violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).

The ATS grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. The ATS lay mostly dormant for two centuries after its enactment. In the last few decades, however, litigants have urged courts to allow private rights of action under the ATS for various alleged human rights abuses. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, this Court held that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.” Id., at 724. At the same time—and in considerable tension with that point—the Court said that the ATS allows for the possibility of new, judicially created causes of action to enforce norms of international law. Id., at 724–725. Though Sosa did not “close the door” on judicially created rights of action under the ATS, Sosa emphasized the narrowness of its view and underscored the need for “vigilant doorkeeping.” Id., at 729. Sosa proposed a two-step framework for creating those causes of action: First, a plaintiff must show that the norm has a “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations,” id., at 732; second, a plaintiff must show that it would be prudent for the court to create the proposed cause of action when the political branches have not acted, id., at 726, 736, n. 27. Since Sosa, the Court has never created an ATS right of action.

In this case, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. The Ninth Circuit focused on whether aiding-and-abetting liability may be imposed under the ATS. 73 F. 4th 700, 716. At Sosa’s first step, the Ninth Circuit found that “aiding and abetting liability is sufficiently definite and universal to be a viable form of liability under the ATS.” 73 F.4th, at 718. At the second step, it concluded that neither “foreign relations concerns” nor “deference to Congress” supplied a “prudential reason to decline to recognize aiding or abetting liability.” Id., at 720. The Ninth Circuit also held that the TVPA “encompasses claims against those who aid and abet torture.” Id., at 744. The Court granted certiorari to determine whether Cisco may be held liable for aiding and abetting offenses under the ATS, and whether two of its executives may be held liable under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture.

Issue: 

May courts create new claims under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international law, and does the Torture Victim Protection Act allow claims against people who aid and abet torture?

Holding: Reversed and remanded.

1. Courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms under the ATS.

2. The TVPA, which contains an express cause of action against someone who “subjects” another to torture, does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability. 

Skinny: Want new ways to sue over international atrocities? Take it to Congress, 9th Circuit — you don’t get to write the law.