They say time flies when you're having fun. Frankly, I think by the time you reach my age, it flies whether you're having fun or not. All I know is that I blinked and we're only a few weeks away from the start of the Supreme Court's 2026 term — and I left off on the Skinny of SCOTUS rundowns with the 2025 term's April decisions.
That leaves 38 decisions from the 2025 term to skinnify. I guess I'd best get crackin'!
We'll start with the mid-May 2026 decisions — and this is a bit of an odd assortment: We have three unanimous decisions, one 8-1 split (with Justice Elena Kagan being the lone dissenter), and then a per curiam "DIG" (writ dismissed as improvidently granted), with Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, Roberts, and Thomas dissenting.
And the cases cover arbitration, trucking liability, confiscated Cuban property, pension calculations, and death penalty IQ tests.
As noted, there's a lot of ground to cover, so let's dive in:
Jules v. Andre Balazes Properties
Date: May 14, 2026
Author: Sonia Sotomayor
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 2nd Circuit
Basic Facts:
Between 2017 and 2020, petitioner Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles, California. When the hotel ended his employment in March 2020, Jules sued in Federal District Court in New York, alleging that respondents unlawfully discriminated against him in violation of federal and state law. Citing an arbitration agreement Jules had signed before beginning work at the hotel, respondents moved to stay federal proceedings pending arbitration under § 3 of the FAA. The District Court held that the arbitration agreement covered Jules's claims and stayed proceedings. Jules then commenced arbitration against respondents. The arbitrator issued a final award, ruling against Jules on all claims and awarding approximately $34,500 in sanctions to respondents. Back in the same District Court that had previously stayed Jules's claims pending arbitration, respondents moved to confirm the award under § 9. Jules opposed confirmation while cross-moving to vacate the arbitral award under § 10 on various grounds. Jules argued that, under Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to confirm the award because the § 9 and § 10 motions neither presented federal questions nor satisfied the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed and confirmed the arbitral award. The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Badgerow involved a freestanding action commenced for the sole purpose of vacating an arbitral award, but that the present action was distinct because it started as a federal-question suit before it was stayed pending arbitration. The Second Circuit held that a court with the power to stay an action under § 3 has the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award, regardless of whether there is an independent jurisdictional basis for the § 9 and § 10 proceedings.
Issue:
This case presents the question whether a federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims, even when the motion to confirm under § 9 or the motion to vacate under § 10 does not independently present a basis for federal jurisdiction on its face.
Holding: Affirmed.
A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under § 3 of the FAA has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in § 9 and § 10 of the FAA; nothing in the FAA precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdiction regarding live claims pending before a federal court.
Skinny:
He who starts the job may finish the job. (If a federal court sends a case to arbitration, it can finish the job by ruling on the resulting arbitration award.)
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC
Date: May 14, 2026
Author: Amy Coney Barrett
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 7th Circuit
Basic Facts:
Petitioner Shawn Montgomery sustained severe and permanent injuries after his tractor trailer was struck by a truck driven by respondent Yosniel Varela-Mojena. Varela-Mojena was driving a load of plastic pots through Illinois for respondent Caribe Transport II, LLC, a motor carrier. Respondent C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.—a transportation broker—had coordinated the shipment. Montgomery sued all respondents in Federal District Court and alleged, among other things, that C.H. Robinson was liable for his injuries because it negligently hired Varela-Mojena and Caribe Transport. Montgomery claimed that C.H. Robinson knew (or should have known) from Caribe Transport’s safety rating that hiring it to transport goods was reasonably likely to result in crashes that would injure others. The District Court held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA)—which preempts state laws related to the prices, routes, and services of the trucking industry, 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1)—expressly preempted Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson. The District Court further held that the claim did not fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which provides that the FAAAA’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” § 14501(c)(2)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the FAAAA’s safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against brokers like C.H. Robinson that coordinate shipments in the transportation industry.
Issue:
Does the FAAAA preempt a state-law negligent-hiring claim against a transportation broker for selecting an allegedly unsafe motor carrier, or does that claim fall within the Act’s motor-vehicle safety exception?
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the Act.
Skinny:
No break for brokers — federal trucking law doesn't shield brokers from state negligence suits for hiring unsafe trucking companies.
Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
Date: May 21, 2026
Author: Clarence Thomas
Split: 8-1
Dissent: Kagan
Appeal From: 11th Circuit
Basic Facts:
In 1928, the United States-based Havana Docks Corporation acquired from the Cuban Government a property interest in the development and operation of docks at the Port of Havana. That property interest, a usufructuary concession, was time-limited and set to expire in 2004. The Cuban Government agreed that, if it expropriated the docks before 2004, it would compensate Havana Docks for the value of the works it had constructed. After Fidel Castro seized power in 1959, the new Cuban Government decreed that it would forcibly take American-owned properties and enterprises in Cuba and specifically identified Havana Docks. As relevant here, the Cuban Government seized, without compensation, the docks that Havana Docks had constructed and its property interest in those docks. Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified about $9 million in losses, plus six percent annual interest. Despite these certified losses, Havana Docks lacked any means to obtain compensation. That began to change in 1996, when Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 22 U. S. C. § 6021 et seq., which creates a private right of action for United States nationals who own claims to “property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959,” § 6082(a)(1)(A). Title III of the Act imposes liability on those who knowingly and intentionally traffic in such confiscated property. §§ 6023(13)(A)(i), (ii). The Act authorizes the President to “suspend” the Title III right of action, §§ 6085(c)(1), (2), and Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama continuously suspended the right of action from its effective date onward. President Trump allowed the suspension of the Title III right of action to expire in May 2019.
From 2016 to 2019, four commercial cruise lines—Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises—transported nearly a million paid passengers to Cuba, using the docks that Havana Docks built to embark and disembark their passengers. In 2019, Havana Docks invoked Title III and sued the cruise lines in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The cruise lines argued they were not liable because Havana Docks’ property interest would have expired in 2004 even absent confiscation. The District Court rejected that argument and entered summary judgment against all four cruise lines, awarding Havana Docks more than $100 million from each. A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed. In its view, a defendant is liable for trafficking in confiscated property only if its actions would have interfered with the plaintiff’s property interest had there been no confiscation. On that view, because Havana Docks’ concession would have expired before 2016, the cruise lines’ challenged conduct from 2016 to 2019 did not constitute trafficking.
Issue:
Does Title III require Havana Docks to show that the cruise lines trafficked in its time-limited property interest in the docks, or is their later commercial use of the physical docks themselves enough?
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
The cruise lines’ use of the docks is sufficient to establish that they used “property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government”; Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines trafficked in Havana Docks’ property interest.
Skinny:
Havana, ooh na-na — companies can face liability for using property Cuba confiscated from Americans even after the Americans’ original property rights would have expired.
M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund
Date: May 21, 2026
Author: Ketanji Brown Jackson
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: D.C. Circuit
Basic Facts:
Pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, an employer that stops participating in an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan (MPP), must pay the plan “withdrawal liability,” i.e., the employer’s share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits (UVBs). See 29 U. S. C. § 1391. Withdrawal liability is calculated based on the plan’s UVBs “as of” the statutory measurement date—the last day of the plan year preceding the employer’s withdrawal. §§ 1391(b)(2)(E)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i), (3)(A), (4)(A). Determining the value of a plan’s UVBs depends upon both hard data (such as the number of beneficiaries and the value of the plan’s assets) and a variety of actuarial predictions about the future. One key actuarial assumption is the discount rate, which is the interest rate “used to discount future benefit payments to their present value.” 87 Fed. Reg. 62317.
Petitioners are four employers who withdrew from the IAM National Pension Fund (Fund)—an underfunded MPP—between April and December 2018. The Fund assessed each employer’s withdrawal liability “as of” December 31, 2017 (the measurement date). In making this calculation, the Fund applied a discount rate of 6.50%, which it had adopted with its actuarial firm in January 2018. The Fund had previously used a discount rate of 7.50% to value its UVBs. Petitioners each initiated arbitrations challenging their assessments. In each case, the arbitrators determined that the assessments were erroneous because the Fund had applied actuarial assumptions adopted after the measurement date. The arbitrators instead required the Fund to use the actuarial assumptions that were “in effect” on the measurement date—i.e., the 7.50% discount rate. App. 293. The Fund sought review in Federal District Court. The courts disagreed with the arbitrators and held that actuaries could use assumptions adopted after the measurement date. The D. C. Circuit affirmed in a consolidated appeal. Its decision conflicted with a decision of the Second Circuit, and this Court granted certiorari to resolve when actuarial assumptions may be selected for purposes of calculating withdrawal liability.
Issue:
Does ERISA require the actuarial assumptions used to calculate an employer’s pension-plan withdrawal liability to have been selected on or before the statutory measurement date?
Holding: Affirmed.
The provisions of ERISA governing the calculation of withdrawal liability—§§ 1391 and 1393—do not require the actuarial assumptions underlying that calculation to be selected on or before the measurement date.
Skinny:
Before you head for the pension-plan exit, check the price of the ticket.
Date: May 21, 2026
Author: Per Curiam
Split: Non-conventional (Concurrence by Sotomayor, Jackson)
Dissent: Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, Roberts
Appeal From: 11th Circuit
Basic Facts:
Joseph Clifton Smith was sentenced to death in Alabama for a 1997 murder. After SCOTUS held in Atkins v. Virginia that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing intellectually disabled offenders, Smith sought to establish that he qualified. Alabama's standard required him to prove, among other things, an IQ of 70 or below. Smith, however, had five IQ scores ranging from 72 to 78. Because IQ tests have margins of error, his lowest score of 72 carried a range extending down to 69. A federal district court ultimately concluded, after considering his scores along with expert testimony and evidence of his adaptive functioning, that Smith was intellectually disabled and could not constitutionally be executed.
The 11th Circuit initially upheld that determination, but in 2024 the Supreme Court vacated its ruling because it wasn't clear whether the appeals court had effectively adopted a rule under which one IQ score whose margin of error dipped below 70 was enough, or instead had considered all of Smith's scores and other evidence holistically. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit said it meant the latter and again ruled for Smith.
Issue:
Whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in determining whether a death-row inmate is intellectually disabled under Atkins v. Virginia and therefore constitutionally ineligible for execution.
Holding: Dismissed as improvidently granted (DIG'd)
Skinny:
SCOTUS took a second shot at deciding how multiple IQ scores factor into death-penalty cases — then decided not to decide.
You can check out prior installments of The Skinny on SCOTUS series here.
