I've debated whether or not to write up an "Early May" installment for the Skinny on SCOTUS series, because there really are only two opinions (not counting the odd-wad orders). BUT...there will soon be quite a few more being handed down, given that we are heading into the last six weeks of the 2024 term, so it somewhat makes sense to go ahead and address these now.
The two decisions stand in stark contrast: One is unanimous, one is a 7-2 split; one is from the regular/merits docket, one is from the emergency docket.
So, let's delve into them:
Early May 2025 Decisions
Date: May 15, 2025
Author: Kagan
Split: 9-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
Respondent Roberto Felix, Jr., a law enforcement officer, pulled over Ashtian Barnes for suspected toll violations. Felix ordered Barnes to exit the vehicle, but Barnes began to drive away. As the car began to move forward, Felix jumped onto its doorsill and fired two shots inside. Barnes was fatally hit but managed to stop the car. About five seconds elapsed between when the car started moving and when it stopped. Two seconds passed between the moment Felix stepped on the doorsill and the moment he fired his first shot.
Barnes’s mother sued Felix on Barnes’s behalf, alleging that Felix violated Barnes’s Fourth Amendment right against excessive force. The District Court granted summary judgment to Felix, applying the Fifth Circuit’s “moment-of-threat” rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that the moment-of-threat rule requires asking only whether an officer was “in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in [his] use of deadly force.” 91 F. 4th 393, 397. Under the rule, events “leading up to the shooting” are “not relevant.” Ibid. Here, the “precise moment of threat” was the “two seconds” when Felix was clinging to a moving car. Id., at 397–398. Because Felix could then have reasonably believed his life in danger, the panel held, the shooting was lawful. Id., at 398.
Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which requires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from “the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force requires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 427–428; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 9. That analysis demands “careful attention to the facts and circumstances” relating to the incident. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396.
Skinny: Context matters. Basically, the lower courts were taking too narrow a view in assessing whether the use of force was objectively reasonable.
Date: May 16, 2025
Author: Per Curiam
Split: 7-2
Dissent: Alito, Thomas
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
The President has invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), Rev. Stat. §4067, 50 U. S. C. §21, to remove Venezuelan nationals who are members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. See Presidential Proclamation No. 10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033 (2025). Applicants are two detainees identified as members of TdA and a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas. All of the alleged TdA members in the putative class are currently being held in U. S. detention facilities. In the application before the Court, the detainees seek injunctive relief against summary removal under the AEA.
Whether the Supreme Court should stay the removal of a proposed class of Venezuelan men in immigration custody and preserve the status quo for individuals challenging their removal under the Alien Enemies Act in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
The application for an injunction pending further proceedings is granted. The motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix under seal is also granted. Additionally, applicants suggested this Court treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari; doing so, the petition is granted. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Fifth Circuit. In resolving the detainees’ appeal, the Fifth Circuit should address (1) all the normal preliminary injunction factors, including likelihood of success on the merits, as to the named plaintiffs’ underlying habeas claims that the AEA does not authorize their removal pursuant to the President’s March 14, 2025, Proclamation, and (2) the issue of what notice is due, as to the putative class’s due process claims against summary removal. The Government is enjoined from removing the named plaintiffs or putative class members in this action under the AEA pending order by the Fifth Circuit and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.
The Government may remove the named plaintiffs or putative class members under other lawful authorities.
Skinny: Okay - the true skinny on this one is: The (alleged) gangbangers stay put — for now.
BUT...there's honestly a lot more to it:
- The Supreme Court is not prohibiting the removal of illegal alien Tren de Aragua (TdA) members under the AEA ever; it is simply pausing the process temporarily.
- It is not (yet) weighing in on the merits of the proclamation issued by President Donald Trump and AEA removal.
- It is saying that those who may be subject to removal pursuant to the AEA and proclamation are entitled to due process, consisting of some degree of notice more than 24 hours prior to removal.
- And it is also very clearly saying that "The Government may remove the named plaintiffs or putative class members under other lawful authorities" (e.g., the Immigration Nationality Act (INA)).
- And mostly what it is saying is that it's temporarily pressing pause so that everyone can take a breath and no one gets erroneously shipped off to prison in El Salvador because everyone was in a mad scramble over it.
However, in doing so, the court likely bought more headaches for itself and the judicial system, and already, the 5th Circuit has let it be known it's not a fan of this ruling. (This one is far from over.)
READ MORE: Breaking: Supreme Court Again Blocks Trump Admin From Deporting TdA Members Without 'Proper' Notice
'This Is a District Court—Not a Denny’s': 5th Circuit Responds to SCOTUS in TdA Case and Hoo Boy
You can also check out prior installments of The Skinny on SCOTUS series here.
