I started writing this a week ago, and then things got even more hectic, and now I'm delivering these SCOTUS rundowns in belated (though hopefully not bedraggled) fashion.
The court was quite busy in the last half of June, delivering 21 decisions before closing out its 2024 term. The first batch came on June 18, when they handed down five decisions — one unanimous, one 7-2 split (with Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts as the dissenters), two 6-3 splits (one with the liberal justices as the dissenters, one with Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito), and one 5-4 split.
The issues covered ranged from prisoners' rights to regulatory rulings to sex transition treatments for minors. And, as noted, there are 16 more decisions following these, so let's dive in:
June 18, 2025 Decisions
Date: June 18, 2025
Author: Roberts
Split: 5-4
Dissent: Barrett, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh
Appeal From: 6th Circuit
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires prisoners with complaints about prison conditions to exhaust available grievance procedures before filing suit in federal court. 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a). But “exhaustion is not required” when a prison administrator “threaten[s] individual inmates so as to prevent their use of otherwise proper procedures.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 644. “Such interference with an inmate’s pursuit of relief renders the administrative process unavailable,” so “§1997e(a) poses no bar” to suit. Ibid. The question presented is whether a party has a right to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that dispute is intertwined with the merits of the underlying suit.
In this case, inmate Kyle Richards alleges that Thomas Perttu, a prison employee, sexually harassed Richards and other inmates. Richards also alleges that, when he attempted to file grievance documents about the abuse, Perttu destroyed them and “retaliated against” him for attempting to file them. Richards sued Perttu under 42 U. S. C.§1983 for violating his constitutional rights, including his First Amendment right to file grievances. Perttu moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available grievance procedures as required by the PLRA. The Magistrate Judge concluded that there was “a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiffs were excused from properly exhausting their claims due to interference by Perttu” and that the issue was “appropriate for resolution during an evidentiary hearing.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a. At that hearing, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Richards’s witnesses regarding Perttu’s alleged destruction of grievance forms “lacked credibility.” The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust, and the District Court adopted that recommendation. The Sixth Circuit reversed. It stated that there was “no doubt that a judge may otherwise resolve factual disputes regarding exhaustion under the PLRA,” but it held that “the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial when the resolution of the exhaustion issue under the PLRA would also resolve a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive case.” 96 F. 4th,911, 917, 923. That decision conflicted with Seventh Circuit precedent.
In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?
Holding: Affirmed.
Parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Skinny: If proving he's jumped through the requisite administrative hoops to file a lawsuit requires a prisoner to prove the very things he's suing over, he gets a jury trial on that issue.
Date: June 18, 2025
Author: Roberts
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Sotomayor, Jackson, Kagan
Appeal From: 6th Circuit
In 2023, Tennessee joined the growing number of States restricting sex transition treatments for minors by enacting the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity, Senate Bill 1 (SB1). SB1 prohibits healthcare providers from prescribing, administering, or dispensing puberty blockers or hormones to any minor for the purpose of (1) enabling the minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s biological sex, or (2) treating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s biological sex and asserted identity. At the same time, SB1 permits a healthcare provider to administer puberty blockers or hormones to treat a minor’s congenital defect, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury.
Three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor challenged SB1 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court partially enjoined SB1, finding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, that SB1 discriminates on the basis of sex and transgender status, and that SB1 was unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the law did not trigger heightened scrutiny and satisfied rational basis review. This Court granted certiorari to decide whether SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holding: Affirmed.
Tennessee’s law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review.
Skinny: No sex transition treatments for minors in Tennessee.
Added Explainer: Since Tennessee's law prohibits the treatments based on age and their medical use (rather than, e.g., sex or race), it's constitutional as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate end (i.e., protecting minors from physical and emotional harm and/or protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession) — which it is. The law stands.
Date: June 18, 2025
Author: Thomas
Split: 8-0
Dissent: N/A
Appeal From: 10th Circuit
The Clean Air Act (CAA) channels challenges to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit if the actions are “nationally applicable,” and to a regional Circuit if they are “locally or regionally applicable.” 42 U. S. C.§7607(b)(1). The CAA contains an exception for certain “locally or regionally applicable” actions “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” which also must be brought in the D. C. Circuit. Ibid.
In 2015, EPA revised the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone to be more stringent. Each State submitted a state implementation plan (SIP) detailing how it would comply with the CAA’s “Good Neighbor” provision, which requires SIPs to “contain adequate provisions” “prohibiting” in-state emissions activity that would interfere with other States’ NAAQS compliance. §7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). EPA ultimately disapproved 21 States’ SIPs for failure to comply with the Good Neighbor provision. These States had asserted they did not need to propose new emissions-reduction measures, but EPA disagreed after considering the “contents of each individual State’s submission” “on its own merits” and making individual determinations for each SIP. 88 Fed. Reg. 9354.
EPA aggregated its disapprovals into one omnibus Federal Register rule describing EPA’s “4-step framework” for evaluating SIP submissions. EPA asserted in the rule that its disapprovals would be reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit as either nationally applicable actions or, alternatively, as locally or regionally applicable actions falling within the “nationwide scope or effect” exception based on EPA’s use of “the same, nationally consistent 4-step . . . framework” and its evaluation for “national consistency.” Id., at 9380–9381.
States and industry petitioners challenged EPA’s SIP disapprovals in regional Circuits. Of five Circuits to resolve EPA’s motions to dismiss or transfer, four found regional Circuit review proper. Only the Tenth Circuit disagreed, granting EPA’s motion to transfer suits by Oklahoma and Utah. The Tenth Circuit concluded that EPA’s omnibus rule constituted a single, nationally applicable action because it covered “21 states across the country” and reflected EPA’s application of “a uniform statutory interpretation and common analytical methods.”
Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
EPA’s disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.
Skinny: EPA decisions under the Clean Air Act that apply to a particular state or region get reviewed in that region's Circuit Court of Appeals rather than in D.C.
EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C.
Date: June 18, 2025
Author: Thomas
Split: 7-2
Dissent: Gorsuch, Roberts
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a comprehensive venue framework for judicial review of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions designed to ensure proper distribution of cases among federal courts. Under 42 U. S. C. §7607(b)(1), “nationally applicable” EPA actions must be challenged exclusively in the D. C. Circuit, while “locally or regionally applicable” actions ordinarily belong in regional Circuits. However, locally or regionally applicable actions that are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” must be reviewed in the D. C. Circuit if EPA finds and publishes that such basis exists. This tripartite system reflects congressional intent to channel nationally significant EPA actions to the D. C. Circuit while keeping most regionally focused matters in local Circuits.
Under the CAA’s renewable fuel program, most domestic refineries must blend specified amounts of ethanol and other renewable fuels into transportation fuels they produce. The Act provides a phased exemption scheme for small refineries—those processing no more than 75,000 barrels of crude oil daily—allowing them to petition EPA for exemptions based on “disproportionate economic hardship.” §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Following this Court’s decision in Holly Frontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., 594 U. S. 382, which clarified that small refineries could obtain exemption “extensions” even after their original exemptions had lapsed, the D. C. Circuit remanded pending exemption cases to EPA for reconsideration.
EPA then proposed and ultimately denied 105 small refinery exemption petitions in two omnibus notices issued in April and July 2022. EPA’s denials were based on two principal determinations: first, its interpretation that “disproportionate economic hardship” covers only hardship directly caused by renewable fuel program compliance; and second, its economic theory that Renewable Identification Number (RIN) costs are fully passed through to consumers, creating a presumption against granting exemptions. EPA applied these determinations uniformly while conducting confirmatory reviews of individual refinery circumstances. EPA asserted in its denial notices that the denials were reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit, either as “nationally applicable” actions or, alternatively, as locally applicable actions “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
Small refineries challenged these denials in multiple regional Circuits. Most Circuits either dismissed the challenges for improper venue or transferred them to the D. C. Circuit. However, the Fifth Circuit retained jurisdiction, rejecting EPA’s venue arguments and ruling for the refineries on the merits. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that EPA’s actions were merely locally applicable because their “legal effect” was limited to the petitioning refineries, and that the actions were not based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect because EPA still examined refinery-specific facts before issuing denials.
Whether venue for the refineries' challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the agency's denial actions are "nationally applicable" or, alternatively, are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect."
Holding: Vacated and remanded.
EPA’s denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the “nationwide scope or effect” exception, requiring venue in the D. C. Circuit.
Skinny: This is the mirror image of the Oklahoma v. EPA case above — in this instance, since their actions were "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect," challenges to them get reviewed in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Added Note: We're back down into the weeds with these decisions, and I'm struggling to make heads or tails of them. I do find it interesting that Chief Justice Roberts joined with Justice Gorsuch in the dissent here (while the Oklahoma case was decided unanimously). Time hasn't yet permitted me to curl up with Gorsuch's dissent here to try to and suss out the meaning of it all. I'd like to think maybe someday, I'll get around to it, but...that's probably overly ambitious.
Date: June 18, 2025
Author: Kavanaugh
Split: 6-3
Dissent: Gorsuch, Thomas, Alito
Appeal From: 5th Circuit
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 generally prohibits the private possession of nuclear materials, including spent nuclear fuel, without a license. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission may license the possession of nuclear materials, subject to statutory and procedural requirements. 42 U. S. C. §§2073(a), 2092–2093(a), 2111(a), 2231, 2239. Here, Interim Storage Partners (ISP) applied for a license to build a facility in West Texas to store spent nuclear fuel. During ISP’s licensing proceeding, a Texas government agency submitted comments, including comments on a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared by the Commission for the proposed facility. Fasken Land and Minerals, a private West Texas business, similarly submitted comments, and it also sought to intervene in the licensing proceeding. The Commission denied Fasken’s petition to intervene. Fasken then unsuccessfully challenged that denial of intervention before the full Commission and the D. C. Circuit.
In September 2021, the Commission granted ISP a license to build and operate its proposed storage facility. Texas and Fasken sought review of the Commission’s licensing decision in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit vacated ISP’s license.
- Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the statutory authority.
- Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission’s licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission’s licensing decision.
Skinny: If you weren't part of the initial case/decision, you don't get to appeal it.
Added Note: At first blush, the majority's reasoning does appear a bit circular here. Another Gorsuch dissent (this one joined by Justices Thomas and Alito) I'd like to read, but likely won't ever find the time to.
You can check out prior installments of The Skinny on SCOTUS series here.
