Chris Cuomo Is Not That Bright. Good Thing He Can Hide Behind His Last Name.

Chris Cuomo is the privileged son of Mario Cuomo. He is a liberal. He is a Democrat. He is a licensed attorney. But on CNN he plays an objective reporter who pretends to not be liberal.

He is a liberal. And in fact, off air, Cuomo is very openly a liberal. He also lets the facade down on twitter.

Cuomo, did I mention he was a lawyer?, also is pretty ignorant. Here is his latest on twitter:

Cuomo believes hate speech is not protected by the United States Constitution.

You know who disagrees? The United States Supreme Court.

In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Court held that free speech even extends to calls to overthrow the government except when the speech encourages imminent illegal actions.

The Court expanded this in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) when the Court explicitly held that a law criminalizing racist speech and hate speech was unconstitutional. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion.

But wait . . . it gets better.

In 2011, when Chris Cuomo was actually in the news business regularly, the Supreme Court issued Snyder v. Phelps (2011), which got widespread coverage, including by ABC News, then Cuomo’s beard for objectivity. The 8-1 decision held that Westboro Baptist Church could protest funerals and such.

Honestly, Chris Cuomo mouths off like this on air at CNN and on twitter. Each time he shows himself to be an ignorant dumbass, both shallow in his depth of understanding of the issues, and a maliciously hostile liberal to those he views as beneath him or “other”. It really tarnishes the image of his network and I get the sense the suits in New York really don’t care, which is sad.

Cuomo is not just a liberal. He’s also not that bright and has hidden behind his last name, not his capabilities, to advance himself in the media.

By the way, it is worth noting that Cuomo is trying to hide behind Chaplinsky vs. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568 (1942). But notice his tweet concerns “hate speech” and not “fighting words.” There is a constitutional distinction.

In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, a case that involved a cross burning in a black family’s front yard, the Court unanimously held that

Although the phrase in the ordinance, “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others,” has been limited by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s construction to reach only those symbols or displays that amount to “fighting words,” the remaining, unmodified terms make clear that the ordinance applies only to “fighting words” that insult, or provoke violence, “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use “fighting words” in connection with other ideas — to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality — are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.

If that wasn’t enough, the Court went on to hold:

As explained earlier, see supra, at 386, the reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey. St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression—it has not, for example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That possibility would alone be enough to render the ordinance presumptively invalid, but St. Paul’s comments and concessions in this case elevate the possibility to a certainty.