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	<title>jpers36's blog</title>
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		<title>TSA and the Fourth Amendment</title>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Disclaimer: I am not a lawyer.</p>
<p>My wife and I are planning to travel Thanksgiving Day, and we&#8217;ve both been keeping track of the TSA Rapiscan story.  This morning I asked myself, &#8220;What if a traveler pleads the Fourth Amendment?&#8221; I&#8217;ve been doing a little digging since then, and I thought it would be valuable to share my findings here.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/optout/spp_faqs.shtm">According to the TSA&#8217;s website</a>, the legal basis for the Administration&#8217;s search authority is United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973):</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>Do contracted screeners draw their authority from the  Aviation Transportation and Security Act PL107-71 (ATSA), or do state  and local governments have to codify ATSA to establish their authority  to perform Administrative Searches? If so, what if there is a conflict  with the State Constitution (e.g., random vehicle searches during  heightened alert conditions)? Will the Screening Standard Operating  Procedures be modified to accommodate these conflicts?</strong></p>
<p>Even prior to the passage of ATSA and the Federalization of the  screening work force, Federal courts upheld warrantless searches of  carry-on luggage at airports. Courts characterize the routine  administrative search conducted at a security checkpoint as a  warrantless search, subject to the reasonableness requirements of the  Fourth Amendment. Such a warrantless search, also known as an  administrative search, is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it is &#8220;no  more intrusive or intensive than necessary, in light of current  technology, to detect weapons or explosives, &#8221; confined in good faith to  that purpose,&#8221; and passengers may avoid the search by electing not to  fly. [See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)].</p></blockquote>
<p>So <a href="http://openjurist.org/482/f2d/893/united-states-v-davis">here&#8217;s</a> United States v. Davis.  Basically, Davis attempted to board a plane while hiding a gun in his briefcase.  He was confronted by a law enforcement officer who searched his briefcase and discovered the gun.  Davis was charged with attempting to board an aircraft while carrying a concealed weapon.  His unsuccessful defense was on Fourth Amendment grounds.  The 9th Circuit basically found that &#8220;administrative&#8221; searches, which have a goal other than criminal investigation, are acceptable under the Fourth Amendment with caveats.</p>
<p>I&#8217;d suggest you read the whole thing if you&#8217;re so inclined, but the crux of my post is TSA&#8217;s claim of performing an &#8220;administrative&#8221; search.  Here are the relevant limitations the decision provides (footnotes removed):</p>
<blockquote>
<div id="p54" class="num"><span class="num">54</span> One important caveat should be stressed, however.  To  meet the test of reasonableness, an administrative screening search must  be as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction  of the administrative need that justifies it.   It follows that airport screening searches are valid only if they  recognize the right of a person to avoid search by electing not to board  the aircraft.</div>
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<div id="p55" class="num"><span class="num">55</span> It is difficult to see how the need to prevent weapons  and explosives from being carried aboard the plane could justify the  search of a person who had elected not to board.  Perhaps it could be  argued that a compelled search might lead to the apprehension of a  potential hijacker, eliminating or at least reducing the chance that he  would try again.  Compared to the degree of additional intrusiveness  that compulsory searches involve, however, this possibility seems so  slight as to be inconsequential.  The risk of successful hijacking is  not enhanced by allowing a potential passenger to avoid a search on a  particular occasion by electing not to fly. Airport screening searches,  as carried out in this case and as currently employed nationwide, are  not selective.  A prospective passenger who elects not to fly on an  earlier flight is, like all other passengers, certain to be subjected to  a search before he can board a later flight.</div>
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<div id="p56" class="num"><span class="num">56</span> It is significant that the regulations establishing the airport search program do not authorize or require compelled searches.</div>
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<div id="p57" class="num"><span class="num">57</span> Since a compelled search of persons who elect not to  board would not contribute to barring weapons and explosives from the  plane, it could serve only the purpose of apprehending violators of  either the criminal prohibition against attempting to board an aircraft  while carrying a concealed weapon, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1472(l), or some other  criminal statute.  Such searches would be criminal investigations  subject to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth  Amendment.</div>
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<div id="p58" class="num"><span class="num">58</span> In sum, airport screening searches of the persons and  immediate possessions of potential passengers for weapons and explosives  are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment provided each prospective  boarder retains the right to leave rather than submit to the search.</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="num">The first thing I&#8217;ll point out is that under this ruling, boarders <em>retain the right to leave</em>.  I&#8217;ve read articles indicating that persons fully declining the backscatter/pat-down option have been threatened with $10000 fines.  If so, this destroys the TSA&#8217;s claim to be executing an &#8220;administrative&#8221; search.</div>
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<div class="num">I also find a second point compelling.  55 above clearly states that &#8220;administrative&#8221; searches <em>cannot be selective</em>.  The search must encompass all boarders in order for it to be truly &#8220;administrative&#8221;.  Therefore, the current TSA procedure of &#8220;randomly&#8221; selecting boarders at employee discretion for backscatter scanning also debunks the TSA&#8217;s claim to an &#8220;administrative&#8221; search.</div>
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<div class="num">This definitely isn&#8217;t the end of the matter.  Even if the TSA addresses these issues, the legal basis for their backscatter/pat-down authority is still questionable under the &#8220;no  more intrusive or intensive than necessary&#8221; requirement.  But, as it stands, the TSA&#8217;s current policy is clearly unconstitutional.</div>
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		<link>http://www.redstate.com/jpers36/2010/11/23/tsa-and-the-fourth-amendment/</link>
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