Libya Update


So, who are the rebels? This is the same as asking if we win, then who wins in Libya?

This is a really big unknown. Surfing through all of the news reports on the Libyan Civil War, the story that we would expect to see is the very one we do not. The one definite thing we know is that when the British sent in Special Forces to help the rebels, the rebels killed them.

Meanwhile, the question is what can the USA and NATO do in Libya? We’ve got one aircraft carrier Enterprise can provide air attacks. Amphibious ships, Kearsarge Ponce, and Bataan can provide ground attacks on the coastal cities but then what?

Another important fact is Egypt’s support of implied Quaddafi (they oppose US intervention).

At the end of the day, it will be up to the rebels to win their own war. We can help but there’s got to be limits.

Picture: Official Navy photo of launch of Tomahawk missle from USS Barry today. They are designating the Libyan operation, “Oddysey Dawn”.

Which brings us to the fickleness of the Arabs generally. Here’s the story in today’s Washington Post. First, they had endorsed the “no-fly zone” military intervention in Libya; now that it has actually started, they want to reverse themselves. What are we to make of this?

1) Acording to the story, the Arab leadership had not properly negotiated the meaning and the scope of “the no-fly zone”. How could such an endorsement have been issued without the proper understandings having been reached?

The suspicion cannot be helped. They were just playing politics. Blame the West for the rebels loosing but now that their bluff has been called, the new line is to blame the West for intervening.

2) Why could the members of the Libyan League not have intervened themselves? Just how weak is the Arab World both politically and militarily?

The bottom line summary of this potential reversal is to underline the political and military weakness of the Arab nations.


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3 Comments Leave a comment

Why should the Arab states intervene when we'll do it for them?

acat (Diary) Sunday, March 20th at 11:43PM EST (link)

Seriously, this sounds a lot like “let’s you and him fight” …

We (the U.S.) have zero reason to be in Tripoli. If anyone in Europe is feeling adventurous, let them go to it – the Italians could pay for it just by seizing everything Gaddafi has in their banks – why should we help?

Mew

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self-portrait

Caveat Suffragator

 

These coalitions almost always fall apart

aesthete (Diary) Sunday, March 20th at 11:58PM EST (link)

when actual force is applied and boots are put on the ground. One of the few exceptions that comes to mind is the Gulf War, and 1) there was a concrete interest at stake, and 2) GHWB and Powell were largely in charge of coordinating: whatever else you can say about them, they were both experienced men who were wise to the ways of geopolitics and war: Obama and Hillary are no GHWB and Powell.

The act of defending any of the cardinal virtues has today all the exhilaration of a vice – G.K. Chesterton

 

Arab Politics

GreyCloak (Diary) Monday, March 21st at 3:24AM EST (link)

Just in case some members get upset, or Gaddafi parades civilians wounded in the attacks (he has ordered civilians to his airbases and other targets), The Arab League HAS to cover its behind. Notice that they “condemned” the attacks, but also said they would basically “form a committee” to study the situation. Not exactly a reversal, but pure political cover for its Arab populace.

After years of experience of Iraq and elsewhere, nobody could have doubted that the beginning of “no fly” is “blow up the air defenses.”

Qatar is sending aircraft, because it can. The Saudis won’t because they have their own problems internally, and with Yemen and Bahrain.

The Egyptians could intervene, and would (they soundly defeated Gaddafi in 1977), but their army is needed to provide security back home … their people do NOT trust what remains of their police force.

Meanwhile, nobody believes a word of what Gaddafi says, nor what he allows the BBC to report from Tripoli.