“When warring nations maintaine a shared humanity, they can follow rules, even in war. “

We need to understand that they do not play by the rules that once ruled politics and adjust accordingly.

yet the Michael Yon story on Pedros, linked above, addresses that issue, at least partly.

There doesn’t seem to be much downside to the notion of arming the Medevacs. Especially since the USMC and USAF have already done this. Only the USA remains tethered to the notion of not arming medevacs.

A middle solution would be to at least remove the red crosses even if you didn’t add the guns. You could still send the Apaches to fly cover and you wouldn’t be advertising “Shoot at me and I won’t shoot back!” on your aircraft.

The reason I linked to 3 separate stories by Yon is that he covers all the bases on these things. I’m not trying to be all inclusive in 750 words. I’m trying to frame the issue and give resources for those wanting more info.

And, of course, I’m wanting input from folks such as yourself who have practical experience that would support or poke holes in the premise.

Thanks for both your service and your comment!

The army has personnel who CAN engage the enemy. The point is that if medevacs are being fired upon, or they are not going into hot areas because they are not armed, something needs to be done. It is not our job to assign MOS’es, the commanders can figure out the how part of the equation.

I was in a Stryker Battalion before a training injury ended my adventure during final trainup for my first deployment. A normal Stryker (Infantry Carrier Version) has at least two, more likely four armed men poking up through the hatches, one of which is operating a remote .50 Cal. In the Medevac variant, the spots the two rear air guards stood is taken up by the gurneys (we had a technical term for them but I forget what it was) and the medic who is working on the patients. One of those hatches up front that was manned by an armed soldier? Taken up by medical equipment. The remaining hatch, which would have been manned by the remote .50 Cal operator? Our medics took the chair he would be sitting in out so that they could get another medic working on the patients, since the medic was usually busy anyway, usually standing, and could use the extra room.

Needless to say, we escorted the MEV everywhere. I can completely see your point regarding ground ambulances. I would argue that air ambulances have more room. A door gunner doesn’t take up much internal space. From my experience, there is never a shortage of people willing to man the machine guns, so there would be no problem finding someone qualified to man the door guns. In all honesty, the medevacs go where the action is, and young adventurous door gunners want to be where the action is. I know I did, before I got hurt and it became clear my adventure was done.

They are not medical personnel.
Put the medical personnel into vehicles with crews capable of defending them.
We do it in Route Clearance with our Combat Medics. Why the medevac units do not do the same, is a good question.

When I first got to my unit, they had just returned from deployment less than a month earlier. One of the things he used to tell me was that whenever they had Apache air support, they never got hit.

But it begs the question of why escort elements are not integrated with the medevac units at the company/squadron level.

Ah, right. That would require more vehicles/aircraft, more personnel, more cost. The mission benefits are beside the point…

First of all, in the piece “Red Air”, Michael spell out that the Pedros were on base ready to fly, but since it did not meet certain conditions, a MEDEVAC had to be sent. The problem was that the MEDEVAC wasn’t cleared to take off because it had no available support. The author had been on many missions in Afghanistan and said that usually the birds were circling the LZ by the time they made it there. The bird was still on the ground at that point. A Pedro could have been there waiting for them.

It took over 60 minutes to get the soldier to the airfield and he died on the tarmac. They had the resources available for him to be there in 30.

proactively punish anyone who violated a flag of truce or shot at a red cross.

As the current enemy uses the red cross to hide weapons shipments and as a good way to find unarmed Americans, it seems a policy that has outlived its’ usefulness.

Two options exist. First, arm the rescuers and remove the red cross. That’s likely cheaper than the second, which is to train our enemy to the point that they will also proactively punish anyone shooting at a red cross.

To implement this re-education, though, we’ll have to remove the iron fist from the multi-layered velvet gloves.. and I don’t see the political will to do it.

Mew

If the reason the USA has continued its practice is not profiteering or command bloat or some other reason, all they have to do is explain what it is and how it makes their performance of their mission for medevacs – arriving fast and getting folks to the hospital – is best served by it. They could also explain that efficiency to the family and friends of the dead soldier whose story Yon wrote about in Red Air.

It does not have to be about profits or bloat … but it has to be about something! If the Army cannot or will not make the case for what it is about, well – something other than abiding by the Geneva Conventions, anyway – they are asking for reasoned speculation. That speculation does not of itself invalidate the ideas of profiteering or bloat.

The second point of disagreement is that the medevac units of the USA, USAF and USMC operate in different environments and have thus developed different strategies.

Were that the case, it seems logical to me that either only the USMC and the USA or just the USA would be operating medevacs in Afghanistan. After all, it’s been a while since we had a USAF pilot shot down or did an amphibious landing over there.

Further, according to Yon, the three usually operate interchangeably. But the reality is known that if you are in need of a medevac, you hope there are Pedros nearby. They fly – regardless! Regardless of weather, regardless of enemy presence, regardless … How odd that a USAF crew would risk far more to rescue what is likely to be an infantry unit and not a USAF unit if their tasks were so unique that they required such stratified differentiation.

Further, they “cover” each other. As Yon (and EvillerRamsFan above) notes, there was a Pedro spooled up and ready that could have been to the trooper in Yon’s piece in 30 minutes. That same stratified mission and command structure left the Pedro on the tarmac and had the USA medevac wait another 30 minutes for an Apache before taking off.

It would seem, at a minimum, that we are still fighting some other war or we are fighting the ones Yon and I mention, profits or command bloat.

Because if command is into accomplishing missions with the highest degree of success and efficiency, wouldn’t that argue for having far more or only Pedros? Which, of course, is the practical point of Yon’s observations.

Finally, according to Yon, these medevacs serve incredibly diverse situations and are prepared for them. They rescue combat personnel from US, coalition and Afghan units. They do so under fire and they do so from cold LZs. They do so night and day. The do so in desert, treelines and water. And on and on … their training and their commitment is to be ready to do all that at a moment’s notice and give friendly WIAs the best chance at survival.

With a son and friends in harm’s way, that is really what I practically care about. Give them the best chance to come home. Policy that is directed toward that end ought to be either easily defensible or, if far more complex than it appears it should be, the argument should be made as clearly as possible. Otherwise, change the policy. The Army has done neither.

that the AF Pedros were on the tarmac with the waiting Medevac. No Apache was available for escort, so they should have let the Pedros go get him. Instead the Medevac sat on the tarmac for almost 30 minutes…