Markets Start Focusing On Earnings


Things have been very fitful over the last several trading days, but there are several emerging themes that are operative over the short term.

1) Interest rates are on the rise. We’re now in the era of trillion-dollar deficits as far as the eye can see. Next week is going to be a quiet week, but the month so far has seen tremendous amounts of new issuance of government debt across the yield curve. (They’re scheduling their issuances basically from left to right on the curve.)

The thing that has tended to keep rates subdued has been the “safe-haven bid”: the feeling among the world’s investors that you have to own risk-free government paper just in case the world should end. Credit and capital markets have been stabilizing of late. This doesn’t mean they’re functioning normally, it just means they appear less likely to suffer massive new disruptions. This tends to reduce demand for Treasury paper (which is why rates have had room to rise in the face of the stepped-up issuance). It also reduces the demand for Japanese governments (which is why the yen has been falling like a rock lately).

2) Stock markets are seeing the potential for positive earnings news ahead. The overall economic outlook still calls for depression-like conditions, but stocks have been discounted to levels suggestive of total collapse. If earnings start coming in merely putrid instead of diabolical, there’s the potential for stocks to rally. Again, that’s a short-term call. The economic outlook longer-term is still extremely uncertain.

3) Consumer demand shows no sign of recovery. Until it does, the government is the economy, and the government’s growth in borrowing is the economy’s growth in output. The stimulus will do almost no stimulating because it was designed in such a half-tailed way.

4) The banking crisis is evolving. Several very intelligently-written (but very technical) posts have recently appeared, making the point that there’s a big difference between the value of “toxic” assets on a mark-to-available-market basis, and their hold-to-maturity value. On the latter basis, the banking system isn’t insolvent. But for a lot of reasons, that doesn’t mean banks don’t need new capital.

I’m glossing over a lot of critically-important detail that belongs in its own post. But the bottom line as markets see it, is that a nationalization of many large US banks is off the table for now. You can have your own opinion whether this is ultimately good or bad, but markets see a diminution of an immediate risk that a large amount of shareholder equity will be put to the torch. This is a short-term positive.


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To good to be true?

John E. (Diary) Thursday, February 26th at 8:56AM EST (link)

With respect to point 4, I’m interested in your analysis or even your general opinion of this optimistic idea, as represented by Peter Wallison today:

But no change in mark-to-market accounting is necessary for the government to buy the assets at net realizable value, only a decision to buy the assets at the value they would have if there were a liquid market. Unlike a private buyer, the government does not have to worry about selling at any particular time, since it can hold the assets indefinitely.

Finally, one might ask why Mr. Geithner is claiming he needs more time to do something so simple and seemingly effective. The answer here, unfortunately, is that he seems to be barking up the wrong tree.

Mr. Geithner may believe that the banks have not written their assets down below their net realizable value. Or he may believe that others believe purchasing these troubled assets at net realizable value will be unfair to the taxpayers, and he doesn’t want the criticism if he does so. That would explain why he is enlisting the private sector to make the pricing decision.

But Mr. Geithner should check his premises. There’s a solution to his problem, the banks’ problem and the economy’s problem right in front of him.

 

I did read Wallison's piece

Francis Cianfrocca (Diary) Thursday, February 26th at 9:10AM EST (link)

He’s on the right track, but he’s looking past something rather critical.

Let’s say you can somehow arrange to hold the existing aggregate portfolio of MBS to maturity (between three and five years). There will be capital losses, but probably not horrible.

The problem is that this large body of paper contains a large economic balance baked into it, namely it’s all priced to reflect bubble valuations. It’s going to take a huge amount of expensive finance to hold it to maturity.

But that’s impossible, which means somehow or other the government will have to finance it. And that’s going to consume a vast amount of capital, because the government doesn’t use leverage. (Wow, can you imagine if they did? That’s a hell of a thought.)

What Wallison is saying is that banks don’t need to be nationalized. He’s not saying that we’ve solved the problem of poor credit availability to the economy.

Got it, I think. Thanks

John E. (Diary) Thursday, February 26th at 9:45AM EST (link)

So in simplistic terms, the problem is that the government would have borrow huge sums to buy the banks’ MBS; prohibited by the cost of borrowing.

He is speaking dreamily when he says “Unlike a private buyer, the government does not have to worry about selling at any particular time, since it can hold the assets indefinitely.” That implies there is no cost to holding the assets, as if the government could simply print money to pay off the banks now, and tear it up as it is paid back without causing side effects like inflation.

On the other hand, it seems we have found a reason to conclude the banks are not as bad off as we once thought.

 

This needs a more holistic context

Marcus_Traianus (Diary) Thursday, February 26th at 10:58AM EST (link)

While on the front page we are having discussions about “mark to market” rules and MBS, the secondary market is already making bets by trading and in some cases accumulating. Some institutions are even looking at the so-called “toxic” assets as a market opportunity. Where this all ends up? Who knows? Will there be “dumping” of the less productive issues? Sure there will be at the right prices irrespective of the funding conditions. This is just a matter of how much.

In my humble opinion, credit conditions will not improve until individuals have more stable outlooks on their income, perhaps more money in their pockets and serious mortgage lending reform. Let’s not forget the first two points could have been helped by comprehensive tax cuts. However Mr. Obama and his cohorts decided to forego these in favor of historical spending increases which are soon to be followed by curious tax increase on the “rich” which the WSJ chronicled today as mendacity (my word). The latter point could be helped by comprehensive mortgage reform including Freddie/Fannie/FHA/ CRA and the remaining mandatory lending. Instead we are now making payments for those bad loans and kicked the overall problem further down the road. There is no reform in sight that will help prevent a replay (other than to blame Wall Street).

Taken comprehensively, we better get used to low/no growth, tight lending and subpar economic conditions. We will have some stabilization, but I have no confidence in the long term outlook unless something drastically changes.

“Both of our political parties, at least the honest portion of them, agree conscientiously in the same object—the public good; but they differ essentially in what they deem the means of promoting that good. One side believes it best done by one composition of the governing powers; the other, by a different one. One fears most the ignorance of the people; the other, the selfishness of rulers independent of them. Which is right, time and experience will prove.”.Thomas Jefferson

 
 
 

Interest rate, FX prospects

Bham (Diary) Thursday, February 26th at 1:47PM EST (link)

Depending as heavily as we do on foreign interests — especially Asian and Middle Eastern — to buy our US government debt instruments seems very precarious. For example, what if Japan (number two buyer) simply cannot keep buying at past levels due to their own severe economic problems? Or what if China (number one buyer?) decides to flex their leverage to make geopolitical points?

Reduced buyer interest would, I assume, force Treasury debt to be auctioned at higher and higher interest rates. Wouldn’t such rates cascade?

Might reduced buyer interest also imply a loss of confidence in the USD as a storehouse of value? Is a run on the dollar possible? probable?

I haven’t done it personally, but perhaps I’m just summarizing the gold bug’s logic.

Bellinghamster